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Abstract 
The effectiveness of economic sanctions is one of the key issues in current debates in the 
International Relations (IR) literature on sanctions. A key aspect for the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions is how to transfer economic pain to coercive power, in particular, how 
the “sender” might wring concessions from the “recipient” or target, making sanctions an 
effective foreign policy tool. This study contributes to this debate by demonstrating the 
relevance of target country vulnerability. This study engages in this debate and explores the 
factors behind Turkey’s decision to make foreign policy concessions to Russia in the 
aftermath of a sharp deterioration of relations between two countries.  
After shooting down Russian SU-24 jet, the diplomatic relations between Turkey and Russia 
de facto broke down. In regard to this incident, Russia imposed a package of sanctions against 
Turkey and presented demands, only in case of fulfillment of which Kremlin was ready to 
restart dialogue with Turkey. Over seven months Ankara rejected to give in any demand 
required by Moscow, but later Turkish foreign policy behavior towards Russia drastically 
changed, since Erdogan made substantive foreign policy concessions for the restoration of 
relations between two countries. For explaining this turnaround in Turkish foreign policy, 
the mediating role of a target’s susceptibility to coercion – its vulnerability - is brought into 
view. What explains turnaround of Turkish foreign policy towards Russia is domestic 
instability and international isolation which intensified Turkey’s “vulnerability” to a high 
level and made it more susceptible to Russia’s economic pressure. This study establishes that 
economic sanctions become effective under the condition of high vulnerability which is a 
function of domestic instability and international isolation. In this way, this study 
demonstrates that economic sanctions alone do not determine the effectiveness, but have to 
be matched with a context in which the economic pain they inflict can also translate into 
political pressure.  
 
Keywords: economic sanctions, vulnerability, concession, Russia, Turkey  
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Introduction 
The success and failure of economic sanctions continue to be the subject of debates in the 
literature on economic sanctions.1 Notwithstanding their growing significance, there is still 
lack of theoretical understanding about determinants of the effectiveness of sanctions. Since, 
in general, economic sanctions pursue non-economic goals, it is utmost important to reveal 
under what conditions sanctions transfer from economic pressure to political influence, and, 
particularly, in what phase they are able to generate concessions by the target country. In 
other words, when sanctions are successful as a coercive strategy. The statements, that 
sanctions often do not succeed in changing the behavior of the target country or they are “a 
notoriously poor tool of statecraft”2 are simply undermined. However, this foreign policy 
tool has become more popular and the integral component of modern international politics. 
Although economic sanctions can serve as so-called a “cheap” alternative to the use of 
military force, they are not cost-free. Before the imposition of sanctions, political leaders 
should examine when the usage of the sanctions can be maximum beneficial.  
After the shooting down of Russian SU-24 aircraft, Russian-Turkish relations were subjected 
to a serious crisis, and the diplomatic relations between both countries de facto broke up.  
Russia imposed a package of sanctions (a ban on the import of fruit and vegetables, on grand 
construction projects, removal of a non-visa regime and so on) against Turkey. Despite 
economic sanctions imposed significant costs on many sectors of the Turkish economy, they 
did not lead to foreign policy concession by the Turkish government. In terms of 
effectiveness of sanctions, they were ineffective. This unyielding stance became swiftly 
unraveled in the aftermath of the attempted coup in Turkey when, after seven-month 
deadlock, Turkey drastically changed its foreign policy towards Russia and made 
concessions. The first precondition of starting any dialogue between Moscow and Ankara 
was Putin’s demand from Erdogan to officially apologize for the incident. After the coup,  
President  Erdogan visited Putin in St. Petersburg, where they discussed a range of issues 
                                                 
1 Baldwin D. A., “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice”, International Security, Winter 1999-2000, 
Vol. 24 No. 3, p. 80 
2 K. R. Nossal, Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy, Toronto, 1994, p. xv 
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and, especially, the restoration of relations between two countries. Then, the Turkish side 
expressed a readiness to agree to find a common solution over the Syrian issue together, since 
the regional security issues, from the Turkish perspective, are impossible to solve without  
Russia. In turn, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan invited Vladimir Putin to attend 
the 23rd World Energy Congress in Istanbul. During the visit in Istanbul, they discussed not 
only bilateral relations but also renewed their energy cooperation. Finally, Russia–Turkey 
relations entered rapprochement phase.  
Before this background, the main objective of this thesis is to examine the factors which led 
Turkey to make concessions to Russia, a foreign policy turnaround which then paved the way 
for normalization of relations between Moscow and Ankara. The main research question of 
this study is formulated as: Under which conditions do sanctions lead to the intended 
change in foreign policy of the target country? More precisely, this study reveals the 
factors behind Turkey’s decision to make foreign policy concessions to Russia and normalize 
relations with Russia in this way.  For explaining the puzzle of Turkey’s foreign policy 
turnaround, the sudden reversal of its stance towards Russia, the mediating role of 
vulnerability for translating economic pain/costs into political costs is examined. In this way, 
a cross-temporal comparison of pre- and after-coup periods give me an opportunity to study 
the relevance of vulnerability for the effectiveness of sanctions.   
This study argues that the change in Turkish foreign policy towards Russia was not a direct 
impact of Russian sanctions, but a result of increased vulnerability derived from domestic 
instability and international isolation of Turkey. Economic sanctions solely did not lead to 
the concessions, but they became an effective coercive tool only in combination with 
increased vulnerability. What I am dealing with is the intervening variable. Hence, what I am 
interested in are the conditions under which sanctions become effective and lead to intended 
outcomes. The hypothesis therefore is: The more vulnerable the target country, the more 
effective are economic sanctions. Vulnerability translate economic pain into a political cost 
and, hence, determines whether concessions occur. In other words, under the condition of 
low vulnerability economic sanctions do not generate concessions, while under conditions of 
high vulnerability they have the capacity to generate concessions. The level of vulnerability 
activates or deactivates the susceptibility of Turkey towards Russian economic sanctions. In 
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other words, levels of vulnerability determine the conditions under which economic sanctions 
are effective. The work is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, I will present the 
theoretical framework of economic sanctions in international politics, and also conditions 
determining the outcome of sanctions effectiveness broadly discussed on sanction literature. 
In the second chapter, I will describe which is the most suitable method to examine the 
phenomenon in which I am interested in and also the limitations of the chosen method and 
why this study has selected the case of Russian sanctions against Turkey for exploring the 
effectiveness of sanctions. The third chapter will be the most voluminous which will 
empirically test the hypothesis put forward above. Here, firstly, it will be described the legal 
framework of Russian sanctions and it will be shown through quantitative analysis their 
tremendous negative pressure on different sectors of the Turkish economy. Secondly, I will 
analyze Turkish foreign behavior before and after coup periods. The cross-comparison will 
give me chance to investigate factors leading from non-concessions to a concession.  In terms 
of effectiveness, sanctions are found to be ineffective during the first period. In contrast, 
during the second period, they led to concessions. Finally, in order to account for this sudden 
turnaround and the reversal in the Turkish stance from an unyielding stance in face of 
Russia’s sanctions to giving in to Russia’s demands, I will study how this sudden turnaround 
was triggered by domestic instability and international isolation. The level of vulnerability 
reached its peak due to attempt to topple the government unconstitutionally, which played a 
decisive role along with international isolation in generating concessions. Lastly, in the 
conclusion section, I will summarize the main findings and will answer the overarching 
question this study has set out to explore, and reflect upon the implications of the findings of 
this study for the wider debate on the effectiveness of economic sanctions in the International 
relations literature. The latter ties the effectiveness of sanctions to the vulnerability of the 
target country.  
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2.1. Theoretical framework: explaining the effectiveness of economic sanctions 
 
Increasing economic interdependence in the modern world, the wish to escape from the costs 
of military force and enlarged international collaboration through the United Nations have 
made economic sanctions as an attractive foreign policy tool to coerce other states to change 
their objectionable policy behavior. In other words, economic sanctions as part of the 
coercive toolkit, are a form of coercion in international politics. The primary rationale of 
economic sanctions throughout history has substantially remained the same: limiting foreign 
trade and finance or depriving targeted states or nonstate actors from economic benefits such 
as state aid to implement broader security or foreign policy objectives.  As G. C. Hufbauer 
and J. J. Schott have stated foreign policy disputes can be solved in five different ways such 
as “diplomacy, political coercion, economic coercion covert actions and military 
interventions”.3 These policy responses more constantly comprise the various elements of 
abovementioned means and economic sanctions seem to be as “the centerpiece” between 
extremely soft and strict actions. In those conditions, sanctions are rarely considered as the 
“ideal” weapon, rather than they are viewed as the “least bad” alternative”.4 According to D. 
Baldwin, if economic sanctions are viewed within the scope of choice, as he did, then they 
should be determined as  “means rather the ends”. Hence, economic sanctions as a foreign 
policy tool are not limited to specific foreign policy purposes, but they are conceivably 
accessible to policymakers for a series of aims.5 In other words, economic sanctions are one 
among many instruments that a state has at its disposal in pursuit of its foreign policy 
objectives. The perceived advantage of economic sanctions as a tool of coercive foreign 
policy, compared to alternatives such as military actions is that they are relatively pacific and 
inexpensive means. This means they are used more frequently as a low-cost alternative where 
coercive responses are considered to be required. They can serve as an alternative, antecedent 
or auxiliary to the use of military force. In contrast, B. R. Early argues that sanctions must 
                                                 
3 Hufbauer G. C., Schott J. J. “Economic Sanctions and U. S. Foreign Policy Source”, American Political 
Science Association, Autumn 1985, Vol. 18, No. 4, p. 727  
4 Ibid. 
5 Baldwin D. A., “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice”, International Security, Winter 1999-2000, 
Vol. 24 No. 3, p. 82 
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not be viewed as a low-cost replacement with use of arm forces. In the case of United States, 
they cost Americans “billion of dollars and hundred thousands of jobs”6 and it is a quite hard 
choice of resorting to economic sanctions. “US policymakers have not always made those 
choices with an accurate understanding of their true costs and the factors that determine their 
chances of success”.7 This means that although perhaps less costly than military action, 
coercion through economic sanctions is not cost-free and the states should consider whether 
or not to use it when it is beneficial to do so. The costliness of sanctions notwithstanding, the 
United States has applied this policy instrument more than any country in the world.8 Today, 
economic sanctions have become a common and recurring feature of international relations, 
namely, its integral part.9 In fact, one could say sanctions have become part of the toolbox of 
foreign policy and have been widely applied, this, of course, does not yet say much about 
their effectiveness as a foreign policy tool, something that I will return to below. So, these 
unprecedented activities make policymakers and scholars to discuss and scrutinize the 
different aspects of this multifaceted phenomenon. 
There are a number of different definitions of economic sanctions in the literature. D. Drezner 
defines economic coercion 
as the threat or act by a nation state or coalition of nation-states, called the sender, to 
disrupt economic exchange with another nation-state, called the target, unless the 
targeted country acquiesces to an articulated political demand. The disrupted 
exchange could include trade sanctions, boycotts, aid suspensions, freezing of financial 
assets, or the manipulation of tariff rates.10  
 
D. Drezner exactly shows that any decision related to a sanction aimed at altering its 
economic policy has first of all political consequences for its foreign relations,11 that is why 
political goals and foreign economic goals, according to A. Cooper, should be part of the 
                                                 
6 Bryan R. E., Busted Sanctions: Explaining why economic sanctions fail, Standford University Press, 2015, p. 
8 
7 Ibid. 
8  Hubfauer G. C., “Trade as a weapon”, San Diego State University, World Peace Week, April 12-18, 1999 
http://zoww.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer0499.htm 
9 Targeted Sanctions: the impacts and effectiveness of United Nations Actions, Cambridge University Press, 
2016, pp. 1-13 
10 Drezner Daniel W., The Sanction Paradox: Economic statecraft and International relations, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.3 
11 Drezner Daniel W., “Outside the box: Explaining  sanctions in pursuit of foreign economic goals”, 
International Interactions, 2001, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 372-410 
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definition of economic sanctions.12 G. C. Hufbauer, J. J. Schott, K. A. Elliot and B. Oegg 
define economic sanctions in a more specific way: “the deliberate, government-inspired 
withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations. “Customary” 
does not mean “contractual”; it simply means levels of trade and financial activity that would 
probably have occurred in the absence of sanctions”.13 Similarly, A. Cooper defines 
economic coercion as “some form of negative economic pressure that the sender uses to 
coerce the target into either altering its policy or deterring the target from changing its policy. 
It includes neither negative economic pressure used to weaken the target prior to military 
hostilities nor positive economic incentives”.14 In contrast, J. Barber gave a broad definition 
of economic sanctions:“economic measures directed to political objectives”.15 Following the 
same approach, J. Linsday considered them as “measures in which one country publicly 
suspends a major portion of its trade with another country to attain political objectives”.16  
According to B. E. Carter, economic sanctions are “coercive economic measures taken 
against one or more countries to force a change in policies, or at least to demonstrate a 
country’s opinion about other’s policies”.17 Economic coercion by the definition of M. Nincic 
and P. Wallensteen is “the imposition of economic pain by one government on another in 
order to attain some political goal. It is implemented, or at least initiated, by political 
authorities who intervene in the “normal” operation of economic relations”.18 This variety of 
definitions, despite different emphases, firstly indicate the economic sanction’s coercive 
power in international politics. In other words, economic pain has an ability to transfer into 
political pressure, leading to desirable political ends. 
Besides, economic sanctions are also discussed in the context of UN and International law.  
From this perspective, economic sanctions mean UN sanctions and for defining sanctions it 
                                                 
12 Drury A. C., Economical sanctions and presidential decisions, models of political rationality, New York 
2005, p. 16 
13 Hufbauer G. C., Schott J. J., Elliot K. A., Oegg B., Economic sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed., Washington 
D.C.: Institute of International Economics, May 2009, p.3 
14 Ibid, p. 14 
15 Barber J., “Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument”, International Affairs, 1979, Vol. 55, No. 3, p. 367 
16 Lindsay J. M., “Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination”, International Studies Quarterly, 
1986, No. 30, p. 154 
17 Malloy M. P., Economic Sanctions and US trade, Canada 1990, p. 12 
18 Nincic M. and Wallensteen P., “Economic Coercion and Foreign Policy” in Dilemmas of Economic 
Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics, New York: Praeger, 1983, p. 3 
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is a necessary precondition of violation of international norms. In other words, sanctions are 
“a forcible interference in the sphere of interests that are normally protected by law.”19 In 
narrow meaning, those are punishments in exchange for “threat to peace and security”.20 
However, the definition of economic sanctions should not be limited within the scope of UN 
enforcement measures, since in practice, sanctions are employed to react in some way target 
state’s objectionable policy, even there is no breach of codified norms.  
On the basis of the literature discussed above this study defines economic sanction as a 
coercive political tool to influence/change target state’s policy. More specifically, they 
pursue the goal to wring concessions in foreign policy through inflicting economic damage 
upon target state or through disrupting common economic exchange. In economic sanction 
literature, the term “sender” refers to the country which imposes a sanction and the term 
“target” refers to the state which receives economic harm, is being sanctioned. I also here use 
those terms by the same meaning.  Although economic sanctions and economic coercion are 
used from time to time by the same meaning on economic sanctions literature, however, those 
terms are different from economic warfare, from trade war and economic statecraft.21 As D. 
Drezner has mentioned that he uses the terms economic coercion, economic statecraft and 
economic sanctions “interchangeably in the interest of style, but they are technically 
different”.22 Economic statecraft includes usage of both negative and positive sanctions. So, 
sanctions are one component of economic statecraft. Besides, D. Baldwin argues, the 
exposing of certain stance through economic sanctions  “is not an alternative to using them 
as instruments of statecraft; it is statecraft”.23 Positive sanctions (actual or promised rewards)   
refer to a state promising to grant enlarged access to its markets or to augment its foreign aid 
(humanitarian aid, tariffs’ lessening or abolition, investments from different states or entities 
such as World Bank, International Monetary Fund) to another state in exchange for it making 
                                                 
19 Kelsen, The Law of United Nations, p. 369, cited in Hakimdavar G., A Strategic Understanding of UN 
Economic Sanctions, International Relations, Law and Development, Taylor & Francis, New York 2014, p. 52 
20 Hakimdavar G., A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions, International Relations, Law and 
Development, Taylor & Francis, New York 2014, p. 52 
21 D. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton University Press, 1985, pp 12-35 
22 Drezner Daniel W., The Sanction Paradox: Economic statecraft and International relations, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 3 
23 Baldwin D. A., “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice”, International Security, Winter 1999, Vol. 
24, No. 3, p. 102 
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specific policy changes or keeping on pursuing an existing policy. One of the good examples 
of it is the significant role of positive sanctions played in the negotiation between Security 
Council and Iran over uranium enrichment program me. However, our discussion within the 
scope of this thesis limited to negative economic sanctions. Negative sanctions (actual or 
promised punishments)  refer to actual or threatened measures that impose costs or withhold 
benefits from the target for following or failing to follow a certain policy. In other words, 
they are a specific tool for expressing the non-approval of certain behavior. Different from 
trade wars (concerning only trade disputes), which pursue goal to convince the target state to 
agree to new conditions of trade auspicious for the sender and to impact the target state’s 
economic policies through inflicting economic pain and economic warfare which weakens 
the adversary’s economic potential over peaceful or ongoing wartime in order to lessen its 
military production, economic sanctions pursue goal to diminish the accumulation of 
economic welfare of the target by cutting down international trade so as to coerce the target 
state to change its political behavior.24 
Dependent on the number of actors involved in, there are two types of sanctions: unilateral 
and multilateral (also called universal sanctions). Unilateral sanctions are imposed by the 
sender against a single target. The later can include a state member of UN or a group or 
organization within a state, for instance, political or military faction. Unilateral sanctions also 
often target individuals through financial asset seizures, travel bans, suspension of aid, trade 
controls, blacklisting of companies or by other methods, which are regulated by the domestic 
law of sanctioning country. In case of multilateral sanctions, several states or “international 
community”  unite together to impose a sanction against a given state. Though UN sanctions 
also classified as multilateral sanctions, they differ from other sanctions, since UN emerges 
as a third party that demands all member states to employ sanctions on the target. J. Galtung  
distinguishes three main types of sanctions with certain elements:  
a)diplomatic sanctions-1)no recognition  2) rupture of diplomatic relations 3) no 
direct contact with political leaders 4) no cooperation by international 
organizations, b) communication sanctions-1) rupture of telecommunications 2) 
rupture of mail contact 3) rupture of transportation (ship, rail, road, air) 4) 
rupture of news communications (radio, newspapers, news agencies) 5) rupture 
                                                 
24 Pape R. A., “Why economic sanctions don’t work”, International Security, 1997, Vol 22., No. 2, p. 93 
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of personal contacts (tourism, family visits) and c)economic sanctions 1) internal 
destruction (economic sabotage, strikes) 2) rupture of trade relations ( import, 
export boycotts, goods, capital, services).25  
 
However, the freeze of diplomatic relations also can be viewed as a part of economic 
sanctions.  This means actual form of economic sanctions can be featured by  limitations on 
the flow of goods, services, capital, credit, in general sense export, import and finances (i.e. 
commercial finances, bilateral aid), including freezing or seizing target’s assets, travel bans 
and control over markets so as to restrict or abolish the target’s possibilities of obtaining 
access to them. The latter can also refer to monetary sanctions which aim is to destabilize 
currency values, such as inflation and deflation. One of the examples of it is the sanctions 
designed by International Monetary Fund, World Bank. Besides, sanctions are also 
categorized according to their scope. There are more narrow in scope (target-, issue- or 
person-specific), and then there is the extensive form of sanctions called comprehensive 
sanctions. Those are an aggregate program of embargoes, boycotts and financial sanctions 
aimed at totally weakening and subduing a target state. The humanitarian impact of such kind 
of sanctions, as usual, are quite high. If a boycott is a constraint on imports one or more types 
of goods, then embargo, on the contrary, is a restriction on exports of certain products to the 
target state. The next category of sanctions are smart sanctions, in theory also called targeted 
sanctions and discriminating sanctions, are “the precision-guided munitions of economic 
statecraft”.26 The concept of smart sanctions is relatively new and it appeared to be as an 
alternative and facilitative tool of the devastating effect of the comprehensive sanctions on 
the civilian population. To put it simply, targeted sanctions “are meant to focus their impact 
on leaders, political elites and segments of society believed responsible for objectionable 
behavior while reducing collateral damage to the general population and third countries.”.27 
Smart sanctions involve various types of sanctions such as freezing of financial assets, 
                                                 
25 Galtung J., “On the effects of international economic sanctions: With examples from the case of Rhodesia”, 
World Politics, April 1967, Vol. 19, Issue 3, p. 382 
26 Drezner Daniel W., An analytically eclectic approach to sanctions and non-proliferation, Tufts University, 
2010, p 2 
27 Hufbauer G.C. and Oegg B., “Targeted sanction: A policy alternative?”, Paper for a symposium on "Sanctions 
Reform? Evaluating the Economic Weapon in Asia and the World", Institute for International Economics, 23 
Feb. 2000, https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/targeted-sanctions-policy-alternative 
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selective banking sanctions, travel and visa bans, arms embargoes, restriction on particular 
commodities and such as oil, diamonds, timber and natural resources, directly hurting those 
individuals who are responsible for the objectionable policy.28 Due to lack of humanitarian 
consequences, smart sanctions have become very popular foreign policy tool over the last 
decade, but there are still doubts whether sanctions have the capability to hurt the political 
leaders to such a degree that they will be ready to alter their behavior. So, the effectiveness 
of smart sanctions is a distinct topic which I will discuss in detail in the next section. 
Though the coercion is the main reason for the application of sanctions, it is not a single 
objective of sanctions, they are also intended to achieve other effects. The goals of sanctions 
are multiple and if they fail to force a change in the behavior of target, it does not mean 
failure in policy at all. Sanctions may succeed in sending a signal to a target or in constraining 
a target or just achieving less ambitious foreign policy objectives, etc. J. Barber made clear 
that the objectives of sanctions are not straightforward and broadly they are grouped into 
three categories: primary, secondary and tertiary. While primary objectives refer to the 
actions and behavior of the target, secondary objectives refer to the status, behavior, and 
expectations of the sender. Lastly, tertiary objectives refer to wider international 
considerations concerning the structure and operation of the international system as a whole 
which is extremely substantial for the sender.29 Bringing the example of sanctions against 
Cuba, J. Barber explained secondary objective for American politicians as taking domestic 
support through actions against Cuba, and tertiary objective as preventing the spread of the 
communism to the Western hemisphere.30 J. Lindsay has identified five foreign policy goals 
by the sender: compliance(coercion), subversion(destabilization), deterrence (punishment), 
international and domestic symbolism (demonstrative) and came into conclusion that 
sanctions aimed at the first three goals are usually failing and the states more often  employ 
sanctions for symbolic objectives as the reaction to existing situation.31 Besides, J. Lindsay 
                                                 
28 Drezner Daniel W., An analytically eclectic approach to sanctions and non-proliferation, Tufts University, 
2010, p 4 
29 Barber J., “Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument”, International Affairs, July 1979, Vol. 55, No. 3, p. 
370  
30 Ibid. 
31 U-Jin A. A. and Peksen D., “When Do Economic Sanctions Work? Asymmetric Perceptions, Issue Salience, 
and Outcomes”, Political Research Quarterly, March 2007, Vol. 60, No. 1, p. 136 
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does not view punishment as one of the purposes of sanctions, considering it as means of the 
operation of the sanctions. Being interested in the conditions under which the economic 
sanctions have the capacity to change targeted state’s behavior (policy) I concentrate on 
sanctions as an instrument of coercion. In accordance with pursuing central foreign policy 
objectives, one can distinguish between different aims such sanctions can be used for: a)  to 
change the target country  policies relatively modest and limited way, b) to change target 
countries regime, c) disrupt a military adventure, d) impair the target countries military 
potential or e) change target countries policies in another major way.32 
Sanctions can be used for all sorts of aims, but empirically, the success of sanctions differs 
also according to the scope of the aim for which they are deployed. This raises the more 
general question about the conditions under which sanctions are effective as a foreign policy 
tool, which I am going to specify in the following section.  
 
2.2. The conditions determining the effectiveness of sanctions 
In globalization era, economic sanctions have become an increasingly remarkable feature or 
an integral part of world politics due to diminishing legitimacy of the use of force and 
growing economic interdependence. However, there are still great doubts about their 
effectiveness as a foreign policy tool. The issue of working economic sanctions has prevailed 
in the sanction literature for decades. If some authors33 approach is optimistic about the 
effectiveness of sanctions, others34 consider that sanctions are successful only in exceptional 
cases. The third group of authors35 stresses the necessity to distinguish between the cases 
                                                 
32 Hufbauer G. C., Schott J. J., Elliott K. A., Oegg B., Economic sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed., Washington 
D.C.: Intitute of International Economics, May 2009, p. 53 
33 Examples of this position are  Hufbauer G. C., Schott J. J., Elliott K. A., Oegg B., Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered, 3rd edition, Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009;  Elliott K. 
A., "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?" International Security, Summer 1998, Vol. 23, No. 
1, pp. 50-65 
34 For example Galtung J., “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the case 
of Rhodesia”, World Politics, April 1967, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 378-416; Pape R. A., “Why Economic Sanctions 
Do Not Work”, International Security, Fall 1997, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 90-136 (also see Baldwin 1985; Blanchard 
and Ripsman 1999) 
35 In this third group are authors such as Drezner D., “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion”, International 
Organization, Summer 2003, Vol. 57, Issue 3, pp. 643-659; Lacy D. and Niou E., “A Theory of Economic 
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when sanctions have actually been imposed and the cases when they have been threatened. 
They claim that economic coercion is more successful at the threat stage than at the 
imposition stage, although they occasionally work after being imposed as well. Economic 
sanctions are more successful in the initial years of employment, since then targets has not 
adjusted under sanctions yet and the intensity of economic pain cannot be the same over the 
whole sanction phase.36 In the existing literature, a whole array of factors that increases the 
likelihood of sanctions generating concessions have been identified. As a general rule, the 
cost inflicted on the target state matters. The likelihood of generating concessions is high 
when the target's costs of sanctions imposition are substantial or put it simply, sanctions that 
impose larger costs.37 This is especially so if the target is a democratic state,38 or when the 
disputable issue at stake has low salience for the target state.39 In addition, the likelihood of 
concessions has been found to increase when an international institution encourages the 
sanctions40 and when we deal with financial sanctions (aid cutoffs, asset freezes, and other 
monetary pressures) suppressing the main supporters of the target regime rather than trade 
sanctions.41 Besides, the probability of effectiveness of sanctions, in particular leading to 
concessions, is growing when sanctioning cases include the sender’s national security 
interests (for example, big strategic gas projects, or placing an embargo on oil exports to a 
large country will considerably lessen the profits an OPEC state and so on).42 On the other 
hand, the probability of success, of sanctions leading to concessions, has been found to 
decrease when the target country has strong ideological motivation and security issues which 
work against giving in to demands (engaging in struggling for survival or self-determination). 
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They are ready to endure very high costs pushing forward that ideology which is, according 
to them, is vital for survival.43 Moreover, it must be kept in mind that economic sanctions 
have double-edged effects on both sides, despite the fact that as usual, the sender suffers 
much less than the target, otherwise the sender would not imitate it. There is also approach 
that even if the sanctions do not change the target’s behavior they can still be considered 
effective through intensifying the reputation of the sender as a decisive player or through 
creating a situation where the sender prefers status quo44or they are already effective just for 
being an alternative to military force. However, the negative statements about the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions are incomparably numerous in sanctions literature. As 
R. Haass notes: “ (w)ith few exceptions, the growing use of economic sanctions to promote 
foreign policy objectives is deplorable”.45 This leaves a rather doubtful picture of the overall 
effectiveness of sanctions, of sanctions leading to concessions. However, it still seems that 
sometimes, under some conditions, sanctions do work and produce desired effects. This begs 
the question when, under which conditions, sanctions lead to foreign policy adjustment.  
Whereas the effectiveness of sanctions as a foreign policy tool is an ongoing debate,46 or by 
words of D. Baldwin, that debate “is a mired in a scholarly limbo”,47 this study is going to 
contribute to this debate by demonstrating the relevance of target country vulnerability. 
Before focusing on it, we should understand the meaning of successful sanctions which is 
another concept in need of specification. In regard to this, D. Baldwin firstly noted: “the 
complexity of “success” as a multidimensional concept must be acknowledged”,48 then 
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continued that in the most cases, despite the key role of  costs to estimating success, the 
definition of  success  is thoroughly connected with the effectiveness of sanctions in 
achieving certain goals.49 The other, so-called “secondary” purposes of sanctions (such as 
punishment, symbolism and so on) are pushed into the background and the main focus of the 
debate regarding the effectiveness is on whether they are able to empower the sender to attain 
its goals of changing the behavior of the target. But even the sanctions fail to achieve their 
initial goals, it does not mean yet that sanctions are totally ineffective since they can achieve 
other purposes. Sanctions can be accounted successful, according to R. Pape, if they satisfy 
three main criteria:  if the target complied with sender’s demand considerably;  if economic 
sanctions are threatened or employed before changing the target’s behavior, and if there is 
no more convincing, an alternative interpretation of the target’s changing behavior.50 The 
further explanation of this argument is more precisely given by D. Drezner who gives two 
understandings of the distinction between success and failure. First, he claims the degree of 
success should be considered in terms of the size of the agreed concessions comparative to 
the status quo, and not comparative to the sender’s original demand. Second, it also depends 
on the type of demand.51 
The key argument in the literature about the effectiveness of sanctions achieving ambitious 
foreign policy goals is the empirical study firstly published in 1985 by C. Hufbauer, J. Schott, 
and K. A. Eliot. In their study, they view the success of economic sanctions as a composition 
of two components: the policy result and the sanction contribution. The degree to which the 
sender’s policy goals are attained is measured via policy result, and the degree to which 
sanctions invested in that outcome is measured via sanction contribution.52 However, the 
success rate mainly depended on the type of policy or governmental change sought. This 
means that success is relative and depends on the goals that are being pursued through the 
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imposition of sanctions. This is further elaborated by the same authors who argue that nature 
of goals matters, since if the goals are comparably modest (for example, freeing political 
prisoners), then sanctions have a far higher possibility of investing in successful outcomes. 
The “modest change” refers to policy goals that do not threaten the government in power or 
its military capability.53 According to them, the statements in the literature that “sanctions 
never work” is obviously wrong and there are several explanations for it: firstly, in some 
cases, the security, political or other costs related to sender’s demand may plainly higher than 
any pain inflicted by imposed sanctions. In other cases, sanctions can do not work even to 
achieve relatively modest policy goals when they are extremely weak. Secondly, sanctions 
are classified as failing to generate any change in the target’s behavior when they have 
already realized their initial goal such as demonstrating resolve at home or signaling 
disapproval abroad. Thirdly, sanctions sometimes fail since the target and sender have cross-
cutting economic and security interests, conflicting goals in their overall relations, leading to 
sender’s equivocal signals to policy resolve.54 As this discussion shows, measuring the 
success of sanctions is particularly difficult as it is not possible to define a priori what the 
sanctions are to achieve. One of the reasons that there are such discords in the success 
valuation of sanctions is the lack of clearly established objectives. In this study, the successful 
sanctions are defined in terms of changing behavior of the target, more precisely, extracting 
political concessions from the target state. Since in this case, Russia’s demands are clearly 
formulated and concessions in Turkish foreign policy are visible, the objective of sanctions 
examined by me can be measured.  In the remainder of this chapter, I am going to outline the 
conditions under which economic sanctions will be effective, generating an intended change 
in the target country’s policy.   
The conventional sanctions “theory” of how sanctions are assumed to work presumes that 
political behavioral change is strictly proportional to economic pain. The greater the 
economic pain of sanctions, the higher likelihood of political compliance.55 According to this 
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theory, civilians in the target state have the capacity to readdress and transfer economic pain 
to government and, moreover, to coerce them to change their policy. However, the 
conventional wisdom theory does not define the methods and conditions, under which 
sanctions become more costly, but it is given that the effectiveness of sanctions requires 
additional domestic and international political factors as well. Using a qualitative case-study 
approach, Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and N. Ripsman concluded that magnitude of economic 
pressure does not play a crucial role for generating concession by argumentation that without 
political costs there is no serious reason for the target to do that.56 This means that economic 
pain has to turn into a political pain in order to make sanctions effective. On the contrary, 
T.C. Morgan and V. Schwebach have used a bargaining model for observing sanction 
effectiveness and they concluded that the infliction of economic pain is an indispensable 
condition for success, but it must be directed to the ruling coalition. Moreover, for achieving 
any changes, economic sanctions must be politically costly relative to the issue at stake 
between the target and the sender.57 According to them, there are two conditions which 
influence the effectiveness of sanctions: first, high costs to the target augment effectiveness, 
and, second, high costs to the sender lessen effectiveness. Ineffectiveness of sanctions they 
explain through the severe conditions for achieving success, specifying only the matter of 
costs, not examining all possible conditions, which might contribute to the effectiveness of 
sanctions. J. Galtung argues against conventional wisdom theory in his study which indicates 
that economic sanctions often fail due to the economic pain causing the population. 
Moreover, he called it “naive theory” of sanctions considering that the impact of economic 
sanctions is not mandatory to turn into political impact since there are no straightforward 
“transmission mechanisms”.58  
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On the severity of pain inflicted by sanctions or the translation of economic costs into 
political costs, J. Galtung and A. Cooper stress the pivotal role of vulnerability in studying 
the effectiveness of sanctions.59 In order economic sanctions to work, the sender must possess 
its economic resources of favorable asymmetric economic interdependence, since it has a 
capacity to affect on final results. The high economic interdependence (the asymmetric 
interdependence), according to R. Keohane and J. Nye, is an origin of potential power to 
manage resources and they can be measured through “sensitivity and vulnerability”. 
Sensitivity assumes the levels of reaction in the framework of a policy. In other words, how 
rapidly the changes in one state lead to costly changes in another and how high are the costly 
impacts. In turn, vulnerability is depicted as relative accessibility and expensiveness of the 
options that different actors encounter. In other words, sensitivity is applied to portray the 
pressures encountered by diverse state actors due to other’s actions, meanwhile, vulnerability 
is how open are their alternatives to shifting the processes and their own structure to fit their 
requirements.60 This means, under the condition of pre-sanctions high trade linkages and no 
possibility to find alternative markets (i.e. the substitutes of critical goods from other 
countries), sanctions become an effective tool for achieving target’s policy changes. The role 
of vulnerability means that the success of Russian sanctions against Turkey would depend 
on the level of vulnerability and they played a decisive role in achieving foreign policy 
concessions.  
From the public choice viewpoint, the smart sanctions are more effective since they are 
designed to harm selectively the certain groups, such as ruling coalition. The more central 
government is under direct economic pain, the higher chances to effectively influence their 
policies. Furthermore, domestic politically and economically unstable target will more keen 
on complying with the sender’s demands. Besides, the smart sanctions work more effectively 
since the impact of the advocates of a given policy is diminished over time. J. Krishner 
distinguishes two key questions decisive for the outcome of sanctions: firstly, in which terms 
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the economic sanctions will directly hit the target and, secondly, which certain groups they 
will impact. Therefore, how sanctions support or impede the work of opposition groups of 
the target will be the measures for the effectiveness of sanctions.61 According to J. Galtung, 
sanctions (value-deprivation) have an exclusive potential to further political integration in 
the target state instead of disintegration, inducing so-called “rally-around-flag” effect,62 
which in turn, firm the resistance to economic pressure. Put it simply, “rally-around-flag” 
effect is that when sanctions are comprehended by the residents as a common outward threat 
and when the leaders of target state try in such way to unite the population and augment the 
popularity of the current regime. In this regard, R. Pape argues, “Even in the weakest and 
most fractured states, external pressure is more likely to enhance the nationalist legitimacy 
of a ruler than to undermine it”.63 In order to cause a shift of objectionable policy the rally 
around flag effect should be minimized. Specifically, financial sanctions have a great 
tendency to minimize the rally-around-flag effect and they are considered as a much more 
effective coercive tool.  
 According to Hubfauer-Schott-Elliot-Oegg approach, the maximum effectiveness of 
sanctions is determined also by the scope and type of sanctions, how they are imposed, 
whether there is high trade flows for the target due to asymmetric interdependence, as well 
as in which political and economic atmosphere the sanctions are imposed. They concluded 
that the financial sanctions are less costly to the sender and more effective than the trade 
control (export and import), also unilateral sanctions are more effective than multilateral 
sanctions, since  according to the authors, the more countries need to employ sanctions and 
the more sanctions are long-lasting, the more difficult is to preserve an effective coalition.  
Besides, in order not to give a big chance to the target to adjust to the new situation during 
that period, such as finding alternative suppliers, building new alliances and mobilized 
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domestic opinion in support of its policies, the sender should impose economic sanctions 
quickly and decisively with maximum severity. According to their empirical analysis, if the 
volume of trade between the sender and target is commonly twenty-five percent of the 
target’s total trade then the effectiveness of sanctions can be guaranteed. Moreover,  if the 
target is economically unhealthy and politically unstable (i.e. high unemployment, rampant 
inflation coupled with substantial internal dissent, etc.) then the effectiveness of sanctions 
are high.64 Besides, the regime type also plays a significant role in the successful outcome of 
economic sanctions since the risk of manipulation of citizens by the leaders of an 
authoritarian regime is quite high. According to R. Hass, there are three possible reasons of 
withstanding of the effects of economic sanctions by authoritarian states: a. possible rally 
around the flag effect, b. setting up the condition of a deficit, in order to manage the allocation 
of goods more effectively by the government, and c. they produce a general deceptive image 
of capability to preserve political control.65 This means democratic governments are more 
vulnerable to the effects of sanctions since the electorate can punish them for incurred costs 
and the number of protests in democratic regimes is incomparably high than in autocratic 
regimes, leading authoritarian incumbents to increase their repression to suppress popular 
dissent in an effort to stabilize regime at all costs.66 The authoritarian regimes can easily find 
the way to resist the impact of sanctions by simply passing the costs of sanctions.  
From the signaling viewpoint, economic sanctions cannot succeed alone and for becoming 
effective they should be merged with primary military threats. The solid argument is that 
sanction success is the outcome of an implicit military threat, and economic sanctions are not 
an authentic motive of political concessions, but they are simply a noticeable signal of 
military power or threat.  The main predictions of signaling approach, such as the sender’s 
cost and a threat to use a force, should be positively correlated with concession size are not 
supported statistically. In contrast, the success of sanction effectiveness, according to D. 
Drezner, depends on the expectation whether the sender and target anticipate military conflict 
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in the future.67 In more distilled terms, the required precondition for economic sanctions to 
generate significant concession is the absence of conflict expectations. His conflict 
expectation model is a substantive contribution to economic sanction literature, which frames 
how the  conflict expectation  affects on the  target’s willing to make concessions and to what 
extent (see figure 2.1):   
 
 
Figure 2.1. The effect of conflict expectations on concession size 
Source: Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999),  p. 46. 
If the sender and target are adversaries then the target will be more resistant to concede under 
the pressure of economic sanctions, since it will be viewed by the target as a delivery of 
political leverage to the sender. “States are concerned about relative gains due to a possibility 
of today’s concessions becoming tomorrow’s leverage”.68 Besides, states care about 
reputation as well, since “ (c)onceding in the present will damage their reputation in the future 
interactions”.69 
This means that the target might have two political concerns: “relative gains and 
reputation”.70 If the sender and targets are an ally, then the relative gains and reputation 
concerns will become less important since the target foresee minimum conflict in the future. 
In this case, the target will more focus on direct costs and benefits of a deadlock than any 
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transfer of political leverage which will result in concession more for escaping from the costs 
of a stalemate. Therefore, if the target and sender are more close to each other, then the 
target’s concession will increase, but in case of adversarial relationships, there should be a 
large gap in costs for sanctions even to cause moderate concessions. D. Drezner’s conflict 
expectation model, which has been supported by solid empirical data,  makes two main 
findings of the sanctions effectiveness. First, the greater the gap between the senders and 
targets costs, the greater the targets concessions. Second, the magnitude of the targets 
concession will augment if the target and the sender predict few political conflicts in the 
future. Nevertheless, if the sender’s demand is more than rational possible concession and 
cannot be agreed, then the result is stalemate which means it is impossible to elicit any 
concession from the target. For the case of Russia-Turkey sanctions, this means that the 
stalemate was excluded since the demand by the Russian president was rational. Besides, 
there was enough tremendous economic pressure on Turkey due to the large gap in costs and 
the probability of military conflict expectation between “strategic partners” were extremely 
low which means that economic sanctions were able to generate concessions. 
Basically, abovementioned discussions lead to the argument, that success is not only 
dependent on imposed costs but that the effect of imposed costs is mediated by levels of 
vulnerability. Low vulnerability resulting in decreased chances of success, high vulnerability 
resulting in increased chances of success. This assumes that “the greater degree of severity, 
the greater chances to succeed” model does not work directly. Domestic instability and 
isolation activated economic sanctions to the level to generate concession. In other terms, 
they granted economic sanction the real political power for producing concession. Hence, the 
conditions mediating the degree of severity play a crucial role in determining the outcomes.  
On this basis, it can be expected that the more politically vulnerable the target country, the 
more effective are economic sanctions. The thesis is focused on discerning the certain 
condition which makes sanctions (economic pain) political coercive tool in order to extract 
concessions.  
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3. Methodology 
The main objective of this research is to identify which factors led Turkey to make 
concessions to Russia, a foreign policy turnaround which then paved the way for the 
consequent normalization of relations between the two countries. The overarching research 
question this study pursues, therefore, can be stated as: Under which conditions do 
sanctions lead to the intended change in foreign policy of the target country? More 
specifically, this study investigates the factors behind Turkey’s decision to make foreign 
policy concessions to Russia and to normalize relations in this way. 
In the theoretical section above, I have formulated the hypothesis tying the effectiveness of 
sanctions to a vulnerability of the target country. In the following analysis, I am going to 
substantiate this claim empirically. I am going to argue that the change in Turkish foreign 
policy towards Russia was not a direct effect of Russian sanctions, but a result of the 
sanctions in combination with increased vulnerability of the country. Economic sanctions 
solely did not lead to the concessions, but sanctions became an effective tool only due to 
increased vulnerability caused by domestic instability and international isolation. In other 
words, the effect of sanctions is mediated by target country vulnerability. The hypothesis 
which will be tested in the following is: The more vulnerable the target country, the more 
effective are economic sanctions. Decisive for externally-induced foreign policy change is 
thus a target country’s vulnerability to economic sanction. The effectiveness of economic 
sanctions increases with an increase in the vulnerability of the target country.   Effectiveness 
means bringing about a foreign policy change. An increase in effectiveness, therefore, means 
to result in more foreign policy concession with the same intensity of sanctions in place.   
In this section I will elaborate in more detail the methodological frames for the following 
study of the effectiveness of Russia’s sanctions against Turkey, describing analytical tools, 
case selection, operationalization and the sources of data collection and the methods of data 
analysis.  
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3.1. Research design: a cross-temporal comparison 
The research design of current thesis is chosen Most-Similar-Systems-Design (MSSD), 
where cases share the similar characteristics but differ in the value of intervening variables, 
which, in turn, lead to a shift of effects of sanctions (i.e. foreign policy concessions, the 
outcome or dependent variable). More specifically, it is a cross-temporal comparison, which 
means that  I scrutinize the effectiveness of Russia’s sanctions against Turkey before and 
after the failed coup with the aim of extrapolating the causal link between the economic 
sanctions, along with the level of vulnerability, and foreign policy concessions. Compared 
with pure statistical analysis, the method of a comparison of few countries is better at casual 
explanation, since it gives a chance to more closely to scrutinize contextual factors and 
identifies not only the causality but also uncovers potential intervening variables. Our goal 
of usage MSSD is to test the mediating role of the intervening variable on the impact of 
independent on dependent variable while keeping external variance constant across cases. 
The best option for doing it is an application of a cross temporal-comparison. “An alternative 
way of maximizing comparability is to analyze a single country diachronically.”71  
In the time-period under observation, all factors remain stable – except target country 
vulnerability, which, in the case of Turkey, drastically increased in the aftermath of the 
attempted coup. The time period that will be covered by this thesis is during the span of 2015-
2016 which conditionally divided into two periods: (case 1) before the attempted coup, 
starting from the imposition of sanctions until the attempted coup, and (case 2) after the 
attempted coup until the normalization of relations. The second case I look into is post-coup 
since sanctions, in essence, remained in place, but the outcome drastically changed from no 
concessions to concessions. In order to explain this puzzle, the mediating role of vulnerability 
is brought into view. In this way, pre and after coup periods will give me a chance to study 
the relevance of vulnerability for the effectiveness of sanctions.  Put it simply, the variation 
of the intervening variable- the level of vulnerability (high/low) activates or deactivates the 
effect of sanctions. In case of high vulnerability, it aggravates the pain from sanctions leading 
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to variation in the effects of sanctions, more precisely, to foreign policy concession. 
Therefore, even when the independent variable remains constant, which means sanctions are 
in place before and after the coup attempt, the outcome of sanctions differs, because there is 
a change in the value of the intervening variable – vulnerability.  
The current thesis has chosen to use small-N comparative analysis since the matter of the 
economic sanctions’ coercive power resulting in foreign policy concession is extremely 
difficult to analyze in a large-N study. Firstly, I have an insufficient amount of cases for a 
proper large-N statistical research and, secondly, there are many context-dependent criteria 
meeting of which is a great challenge and, thirdly, it would require much more resources that 
currently available. The main advantage of choosing the method of a comparison of few 
countries A. Lijphart presented in the following way: “Given inevitable scarcity of time, 
energy, and financial resources, the intensive analysis of few cases may be more promising 
than the superficial statistical analysis of many cases”.72  
One shortcoming of small-N design is that probability of making broad empirical 
generalizations is extremely low. However, I start my research with a strong hypothesis, 
which means that my theory-confirming analysis of cross-cases are already within the 
framework of established generalizations and which can be useful for improvement of the 
theory. Despite the abovementioned limitations, they do not undermine the merits of a small-
N comparison method and it continues to remain the best method for achieving the aims of 
the present study. 
3.2. Case selection 
The choice has been made to conduct a small-N comparative study. An MSSD design is 
adopted since the contextual terms are pertinent to the phenomenon this thesis is pursuing to 
scrutinize. In order to reveal the importance of vulnerability for the effectiveness of sanctions, 
this study conducts a cross-temporal comparison of the effectiveness of Russian sanctions 
against Turkey before and after the coup attempted in Turkey. The selection of cases takes 
into account mainly the value of explanatory factors in our case, the independent variable 
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(i.e. economic sanctions) along with intervening variable (i.e. a level of vulnerability). The 
aim is to demonstrate that ultimately, it is variation in the intervening variable which causes 
the variation of the outcome, and all other factors are kept constant, that could possibly 
explain the outcome.  For evaluating the success of economic sanctions, it is important firstly 
to classify cases according to the type of foreign policy objective. By exercising the 
comparison, it is possible to examine the role of different factors and eventually assess the 
effect of the independent variable, mediated by the intervening variable, on the dependent 
variable.  
The basic guideline for choosing cases for doing comparative analysis is the following: “ (t)o 
include a set of cases that vary both with respect to the hypothesized casual conditions 
(variables) and with the respect of outcome of interest. At the same time, cases should remain 
similar in terms of possible alternative explanatory conditions or contextual variables that 
can moderate how the main effects work”.73 In our case, all control variables remain constant 
and even they have changed marginally they could not account for the observed change in 
the outcome. The case comparison compares two periods before and after the failed coup to 
provide the comprehensive analysis of both. The case selection offers the opportunity to 
compare the two and make conclusions about the relevance of the examined factors. In the 
first case, the economic sanctions occur together with a low level of target-country 
vulnerability and do not lead to a foreign policy change; in the second case, (the same level 
of) economic sanctions occur together with a high level of vulnerability and lead to foreign 
policy change.  
The cases are comparable insofar as they do not have any offsetting international assistance 
which can spoil the effect of sanctions in general, Also, I have taken into account the prior 
relations between sender and target, whether they are relatively close or antagonistic before 
imposition of sanctions. The case of Russia`s sanctions against Turkey is particularly 
insightful for studying the mediating effect of vulnerability on the effectiveness of sanctions, 
                                                 
73 Toshkov D., Research design in political science, New York, 2016, p. 279 
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because of the sudden and drastic change in the level of vulnerability of Turkey, which allows 
to more clearly observe/discern how the intervening variable affects how economic sanctions 
lead to concessions. 
In natural setting there are few cases that are sufficiently similar and would be comparable, 
meeting abovementioned all those criteria. For that reason, instead of finding two truly 
similar cases which “can be comparable in all ways except for one”74 I have divided our case 
into two subcases which give us not only a chance to keep constant control variables but  also 
find the variable that varies across cases and can be thus identified as responsible for different 
outcomes, in our case for foreign policy concessions. Such kind of design best suits our 
research task for testing the proposed hypothesis. It is worthy to remind that one of the main 
reasons why most of the scholars consider economic sanctions ineffective is that the 
requirements towards effectiveness are extremely stringent.  
3.3. Operationalization of variables 
In this section, a set of indicators that are used to measure independent, intervening and 
dependent variables is presented.  
The independent variable is defined as “economic sanctions”. The intervening variable is 
defined as “vulnerability.” The dependent variable is defined as foreign policy concessions.  
(IV) economic sanctions ---- (intervening variable: “vulnerability”) ----> DV foreign policy 
concessions 
In this way, this study proposes a refined understanding of the workings of sanctions. It 
follows the literature on the maximum effectiveness of sanctions which are able to change 
the foreign policy of the target country. Instead of postulating a direct effect between 
sanctions and foreign policy behavior, it suggests the vulnerability of the target country as 
the decisive criterion for the effectiveness of sanctions. Under the condition of high 
vulnerability, such as domestic instability and international isolation, that economic sanctions 
lead to foreign policy concessions. In other words, what explains turnaround is domestic 
                                                 
74 Gerring J., Case study research: principles and practices, New York, 2007, p. 131 
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instability and international isolation intensified Turkey’s “vulnerability” to a high level and 
made it more susceptible to economic pressure.  
For measuring the sanctions I will present (a) the legal framework for the sanctions and (b) 
which  economic effects they had. So, our independent variable will operationally be defined 
in quantitative terms. For presenting the presidential decrees, and the Russian Government’s 
executive orders concerning the legal framework of sanctions I will use the data from the 
official website of the President and, respectively, of the Government.  Besides, for showing 
economic effects,  I need the statistical data on tourism flows, trade volume which I will 
gather from the Russian Federation Customs service, Turkish Statistical Institute, Worldbank 
database and the analytical centers’ reports. There are different ways how to measure 
economic sanctions. Precisely measuring the economic effects of economic sanctions is a 
pure economic issue, and I am not going to deepen in econometric models and matrix which 
is out of the scope of our research. I am more interested in the political outcome of economic 
sanctions. So, my measurement will be limited to using and comparing already processed 
official statistical data, and estimations by experts are also taken into account.  
In general, measuring the effectiveness of sanctions is quite hard and an ongoing debatable 
issue in the literature, since it includes different political, legal and economic complex 
variables. But I am going to deal with more clearly defined task, since, the outcome-foreign 
policy concession consists of actions which are quite visible and consequently, they are 
measurable. The indicators measuring the foreign policy concessions are (a) one-sided 
symbolic measures such as the Turkish president’s official letter of apology, (b) 
compensation for damages, (c) punishment those who are responsible for killing the Russia 
pilot and (d) substantive measures such as reformulation of Turkish foreign policy in Syria, 
in particular, firstly stopping any support to “terrorists” and rebels fighting in Aleppo, and, 
secondly, readiness to engage in a renewed dialogue over accommodating its stances with 
Russia over Syrian crisis regulation.  In principle, the demands of a sanctioning country can 
vary, but in this case, abovementioned things counted as foreign policy concessions, since 
those are the main demands which the Russian President required from Erdogan for starting 
a dialogue between two countries. One of the main sources of information, in this case, is the 
press releases taken from the official websites (presidential, governmental and Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs), official statements done during the visits, the interviews given by political 
leaders for different media channels. Although the reliability is increased by using official 
sources, however, they mainly provide a formal picture. For that reason, the other data 
sources chosen are the investigate news which is more informative and gives a much more 
comprehensive picture about the informal nuances of the policy changes under certain 
circumstances.  
The indicators of measuring the level of vulnerability (intervening variable) are domestic 
instability and international isolation. In turn, domestic instability is measured by growing 
number of terrorist attacks, a new circle of Turkey’s PKK conflict, the attempt to 
unconstitutionally topple the government, such as the failed coup, following three-month 
state of emergency, large-scale purges and international isolation via condemnations by 
partners and emerging political issues with them. International isolation is measured by 
statements and documents, the reports of International organizations about the state of the 
country after the failed coup and leading media outlets will be used as the sources of data for 
presenting the emergency situation in Turkey and how it is resonated at international political 
agenda. 
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4.1. Analysis: Assessing the effectiveness of Russia’s sanctions against Turkey 
After shooting down Russian jet near the Syrian-Turkish border on November 24, one of the  
first countermeasures of the incident was decision by Russian President Vladimir Putin to 
deploy air-defense S-400 missiles to Russian airbase in Latakia for easily destroying any 
Turkish target posing any threat to Russian aircrafts and it is also ordered to further bombing 
operations in Syria to accompany by fighter escorts and since that the missile-cruiser Moskva 
started to patrol in shore-waters near the Turkish-Syrian border.75 The next countermeasure 
to impose economic sanctions was done by signing the decree by the President after four 
days of the incident on special economic measures against Turkey. In his annual address to 
the Federal Assembly Russian President stressed that Turkey will  “regret more than once” 
downing Russian jet and heightened  the shrill tone of speech saying “If they think that after 
committing heinous war crimes and murdering our people they will get away just with 
tomatoes and restrictions and other industries, they are deeply mistaken”.76 It has been the 
first downing of a Russian military plane by a NATO member for more than a half-century 
which provoked Kremlin’s fury since the reputation of great power status was humiliated. 
The Russian-Turkish relations were subjected to the serious crisis which was a remarkable 
sign of Turkish geopolitical turnaround. 
The main legal background of  imposing a set of economic sanctions is the presidential  
Executive Order N583 called “On Measures to ensure national security of the Russian 
Federation and protection of citizens of the Russian Federation from criminal and other 
Illegal actions and on the application of special economic measures with respect to the 
Republic of Turkey” and adopted on November 28.77 After a month some amendments were 
introduced by Executive Order N669 to the main decree, specifying the extended scope of 
                                                 
75  “Russia deploys S-400 and moves guided-missile cruiser off Latakia to protect its jets near Turkish border”, 
The Aviationist, Nov 25, 2015 https://theaviationist.com/2015/11/25/all-the-weapons-sensors-moskva/ 
76 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, Dec 3, 2015 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50864 
77 Executive Order of the President Vladimir Putin N583, Nov 28, 2015  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50805 
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already determined sanctions.78 The main decree was immediately followed by the 
Resolution N 1296 adopted by the Russian Government on measures of implementation the 
presidential decree.79 According to the Presidential Executive Order and the Governmental 
Resolution N 1296 the following measures are imposed:  
1. The Russian government imposed an embargo on certain products of Turkish origin, 
especially fruits and vegetables, poultry, flowers, salt, and others. 
 2. Starting from 2016, employers and contractors who are under the jurisdiction of Russia 
are prohibited from employing Turkish citizens in Russia. However,  the Russian government 
adopted Resolution N 1458 where is listed 53 companies’ names as exemptions  which can 
go on employing Turkish citizens.80 The organizations subjected to the jurisdiction of Turkey 
and also the organizations controlled by Turkish citizens are prohibited from carrying out 
certain activities in Russia. The list of certain types of works (services) which are prohibited 
in the territory of RF is approved via separate Resolution N1457 adopted by the Russian 
Government. The restrictions include the following areas “a. construction of buildings, 
construction of engineering and special construction works, b. activities in the area of 
architecture and engineering design, technical testing and research, and analysis, c. activities 
of travel agencies and other organization providing services in the tourism sector, d. operation 
of hotels and other places of temporary residence, e. works and services for the state and 
municipal needs, f. processing of wood”.81  
3. The Russian Government has prohibited charter flights to Turkey since December 2015.  
                                                 
78 Executive Order of the President Vladimir Putin N 669, Dec 28, 2015  
http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/40335 
79 Resolution N1296 adopted by the Russian Government, Official Internet Portal of Legal Information 
(Russian Federation) Dec 01, 2015, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201512010026 
80 Resolution N1458 adopted by the Russian Government, Official Internet Portal of Legal Information 
(Russian Federation), Dec 30, 2015, 
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201512300040?index=5&rangeSize=1 
81 Resolution N1457 adopted by the Russian Government, Official Internet Portal of Legal Information 
(Russian Federation) Dec 30, 2015 (translated by the author from Russian) 
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201512300053?index=2&rangeSize=1 
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4. From 1 January  2016, the visa-free travel agreement has ceased which means that Turkish 
citizens have no right to travel to Russia without visa anymore. The exceptions are Turkish 
citizens with Russian residence permits or with diplomatic passports.  
5. Supervision has increased significantly over air, sea, road transportation. The control over 
sea transportation companies operating in Azov-Black Sea basin has strengthened. Also, the 
Russian permits for international road transportation have been lessened significantly. 
6. The activities on the commercial-economic cooperation of  “The Joint Intergovernmental 
Russian-Turkish Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation” which has operated 
since 1992 has been suspended. Also, the Government appointed The Ministry of Economic 
Development of the Russian Federation  to suspend negotiation process with the Turkish side 
about  “The bilateral Agreement on Trade, in Services and Investments” , “The Middle-term 
program for economic, trade, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation for 2016-2019” 
and about “Formation of the Joint Fund  for Financing Investment Projects in Russia and 
Turkey.” This means that the joint commercial and economic activities at the governmental 
level between two countries has been suspended. Russia claims that those sanctions are 
proportional and in accordance with international law.  From the Turkish perspective, it is 
not for the first time, when Russia violates the Turkish airspace during bombing operations 
in Syria and the incident is the justified response of violation of another law.  
Turkey’s economy is intertwined with Russia through different major channels. In other 
words, “where geopolitics tended to divide Turkey and the Russian Federation, geo-
economics pushed them to cooperate”.82 Therefore, the economic sanctions Russia imposed 
in response to the downing of Russian jet can be expected to negatively affect Turkish 
economy. In other words, one can expect the sanctions to cause “economic pain”. Below, I 
am going to show the impact of economic sanctions on different sectors which are affected 
most.  The impact of Russian sanctions comes from the importance of Russia as a trading 
                                                 
82 Trenin D., “Really Burrying the Hatchet: Russia and Turkey find themselves on the same side”, Insight 
Turkey, April-June 2002, Vol. 4, No. 2, p 25  
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partner for Turkey. Turkey is the fifth largest investment recipient country for Russia, after  
Cyprus, Virgin Islands Switzerland, and Bahamas (see figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1. Russia’s FDI into Economies of Major Direct Investment Recipient Countries (million  
                  USD) in 2015-2016 
Source: graph composed by author, data taken from Federal State Statistics Service (Russian Statistical 
Yearbook, page 307) 
        In 2015, Russian foreign direct investments in Turkey were around 1.5 billion or 0.17 
percent of Turkey’s GDP in 2015.  These does not include property-related investments. In 
2016, Russia’s direct investment in Turkey was around 1.2 billion and comparing with last 
year it was dropped by 291 million. In 2015 the Turkish investment consisted of 6,7 percent 
of total direct investment of Russia while in 2016 it didn’t exceed 5,3 percent (see figure 4.2). 
Besides, there are several giant strategic projects between two countries, such as  the 
construction of Akkuyu nuclear power plant  by Rosatom and Turkish Stream pipeline which 
will supply Russian gas  to Turkey, then to Europe bypassing Ukraine. Those are the most 
ambitious and investment requiring projects between two countries. The construction of 
Akkuyu power plant was initially estimated  20 billion USD. Due to political “pause”, the 
negotiations over these constructions were frozen.  
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Figure 4.2. Russia’s FDI in Turkey 
Source: graph composed by author, data taken from Federal State Statistics Service (Russian Statistical 
Yearbook, p. 307)  
 
Tourism and construction are the main sectors that are suffered by the commercial sanctions, 
since they are strongly linked the Russian market. Turkey, Egypt and Thailand remain the 
main preferable destinations for Russian tourists. According to the data of Ministry of 
Tourism and Culture of Turkey, the total number of tourist visiting Turkey in 2016 was 
reduced by 30 percent, reaching to 25.3 million tourists,83 which is the lowest figure over 
past years. The main reason for this drastic drop was the increasing security problems in the 
country. Despite this, the number of Russian tourists  dramatically decreased due to Russian 
sanctions against Turkey. In 2015, the number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey was  3.65 
million people, while in 2016 it was 866 thousand people. This figure has lessened by 72.26 
percent or more than four times  in comparison with 2015 year (see figure 4.3). The number 
of Russian tourists makes up 10, 1 percent of the total numbers of tourist visiting in Turkey 
in 2015, while the number of 2015 makes up 3.4 percent in total.  
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Official website of Ministry of Tourism and Culture of Turkey, http://www.kultur.gov.tr/?_dil=2 
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Figure 4.3. Number of Russian Tourists Arrived in Turkey  
Source: graph composed by author, data taken from Turkstat  
Consequently, the tourism revenues  from Russian visitors also sharply dropped.  In total 
tourism revenues were reduced by  9,34 billion USD  in 2016 which is a significant decrease 
by the 29.7 percent of the past year (see figure 4.4). In 2015 the Turkish tourism sector gained 
revenues from Russian tourists with the amount of around 2.31 billion USD which constitutes 
7.35 percent of the total amount.  In 2016 this figure was dramatically decreased by 1.74 
billion USD reaching to the level of 570 million USD. It represents 2.58 percent of the total 
amount of the same year. So, the negative  impact of economic sanctions on tourism sector 
are apparently visible from the given estimations.  
 
Figure 4.4. Turkey’s tourism revenues in total and from Russian visitors (2015-2016 years) 
Source: graph composed by author, data taken from Ministry of Culture and Tourism (Republic of Turkey) 
Link 
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Russia has been the leading market for construction sector abroad for Turkey and it did not 
lose its importance even after the imposition of sanctions, despite the fact that Russian 
economic sanctions had a dramatic impact on the construction sector. According to data 
presented by Ministry of Economy of Turkey, in 2015 Turkish firms undertook the 
construction projects with the total value of 6 billion USD, which is the highest figure among 
other countries which counted for 26 percent of the total value of Turkish constructions 
projects. While in 2016, due to a sharp decrease in the number of construction projects Russia 
wasn’t even among top ten countries.84  
Russia is the third biggest import market for Turkey, after China and Germany and it is the 
main supplier of natural gas (1.Russia, 2. Iran, 3 Azerbaijan 4. Algeria, 5. Nigeria).85 
Currently’ Turkey economy is highly dependent on Russia’s natural gas and it counts more 
than 50 percent of the total natural gas imports. Turkey’s political and business elites are not 
happy with this situation which is evaluated as the biggest portion of Turkey’s trade deficit 
with Russia.86 In 2015, Gazprom supplied 27.01 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Turkey 
and 24.76 billion cubic meters in 2015.87 Despite this high dependency, Russia refrains from 
cutting gas delivers to Turkey since it could have a reciprocal impact on Russia’s GDP as 
well. So, the main import items for Turkey continue to remain Russian natural gas and oil, 
iron and steel, other metals and grains. In 2015, Turkey’s import from Russia made 20.4 
billion USD while in 2016 it decreased by 5.2 billion USD or by 25.7 percent (see figure 
4.5).  
                                                 
84 Turkey’s Contracting Services Abroad, Turkish Contractors Association, March 2017, p.12  
http://tmb.org.tr/doc/file/YDMH_march_2017.pdf 
85 Senerdem E., “5 graphs Turkey-Russia economic relations”, BBC Turkey, Nov. 25, 2015            
http://www.bbc.com/turkce/ekonomi/2015/11/151125_turkiye_rusya_ekonomi 
86 Ward A., “Turkey’s reconciliation with Putin spurs new power projects”, Financial Times, June 26, 2017  
   https://www.ft.com/content/83be5fd4-4ad3-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43 
87 Gazprom Export official website http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/ 
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Figure 4.5. Turkey’s Foreign Trade (Import from Russia) 
Source: graph composed by author, data taken from Turkstat  
 
In turn, Turkey is among Russia’s top five export partner in trade after Netherlands, China, 
Germany and Italy in 2015. Moreover, these two giant economic partners were going to triple 
the volume of  their mutual trade by 2023, reaching to symbolic amount-100 billion per 
year.88 In 2015, Turkey’s export to Russia accounted for 9,8 percent of the total exports and 
0.4 percent of Turkey’s GDP, while in 2016 it accounted 7,6 percent of  Turkey’s total 
exports and 0,2 percent of its GDP. Due to Russia’s embargo on Turkish products the amount 
of Turkey’s export to Russia decreased 1,7 billion USD or more than two times compared 
with last year (see figure 4.6). Fruits and vegetables, textile products and motor vehicles are 
the main export items for Turkey to Russia. The sanctions also put upward pressure on import 
prices, contributing inflation to some extent.  Russia had to find alternative import markets 
for fruits and vegetables among member- countries of Eurasian Economic Union.  
                                                 
88 “Turkey aims for $100bn trade with Russia by 2023 – Erdogan”, Russia Today, Sep 23, 2015 
https://www.rt.com/business/316308-erdogan-putin-turkey-russia-trade/ 
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Figure 4.6. Turkey’s Foreign Trade (Export to Russia) 
Source: graph composed by author, data taken from Turkstat  
 
What these figures show, these punishing measures of Russia mainly undercut Turkish export 
and it have dropped by 51.7  percent in 2016 in comparison with 2015. It had negative impact 
on the activities of Turkish companies operating in Russia  and sharply reduced the number 
of Russian tourists in Turkey by 72.26 percent.  
There are different calculations of the total cost of Russian sanctions by different experts and 
analytic centers.  According to TEPAV’s assessment, the (real) loss of Turkey’s economy 
due to Russia's economic sanctions is $2.3 billion to $8.3 billion.89 According to Bankasi, 
which is one of the biggest and prestigious financial institutions in Turkey, in the best 
scenario, Russian sanctions would cost 4.4 billion USD, in the worst scenario the losses will 
be 7.3 USD billion.90  Immediately after imposition of sanctions, Turkish vice premier 
Mehmet Simsek announced that Ankara’s losses from the tension with Russia would cost at 
9 billion USD a year and in the worst case scenario, they would cost Turkey 0.4 percent of 
                                                 
89 Sönmez M., “Cost of Russian crises continues to rise”, Hurriyet Daily News,  March 7, 2016 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/cost-of-russian-crisis-continues-to-rise-96107 
90 Demir E., “Possible implications of Russia’s sanctions on Turkish economy”, Analytic Report, Bankazi, 
Dec 2015, p. 3 
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its GDP.91 However, the recently done calculations showed that the economic pain of 
sanctions cost Turkey’s economy “at least $10bn in tourism and trade revenue”.92 
Therefore, the Russian economic sanctions had a significant impact on the Turkish economy, 
even some sectors were almost paralyzed. However, as I am going to show in the following 
section,  Russia’s sanctions did not yet lead to a reversal in Turkish foreign policy towards 
Russia and they did not yet lead to Turkish foreign policy concessions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 Interview with Turkish vice premier Mehmet Simsek, NTV, Dec 9, 2015 
92 “Turkey's snuggling up to Russia is likely to hurt it”, The Economist, Feb 16, 2017 
https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21717080-putin-and-erdogan-expect-different-and-contradictory-
things-their-relationship-turkeys 
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4.2. Turkey`s response to Russia`s sanctions 
 
4.2.1 Turkey`s response before the coup attempt: no concessions 
In this section the question is whether these sanctions have brought about foreign policy 
concessions, i.e. whether Russian sanctions as a coercive strategy leads to the desired change 
in Turkey’s foreign policy course, meaning that Turkey would give in to Russia’s demands. 
In this section, I look into Turkey’s response to the economic sanctions put in place by Russia 
in two periods: before and after the attempted coup. Tied to the economic sanctions were a 
number of demands Moscow made towards Turkey. Seeing whether Erdogan fulfilled the 
demands required by the Russian President allows assessing whether the sanctions were 
effective, that is whether they brought about the foreign policy change/concessions desired 
by the sender (Russia). 
First, Moscow asked for an official apology. This demand was made on different occasions 
by the Russian ambassador in Turkey Andrey Karlov and by the Russian president. “We 
haven’t heard yet any clear apology, no proposals for compensation for damages, no promises 
to punish culprits for the crime they committed”,93 told Putin the reporters, meanwhile 
accusing Turkish leadership of deliberately driving Turkish-Russian relations to a standstill. 
The reason why Putin refused many times to contact Erdogan was the unwillingness of the 
Turkish president to officially apologize. Erdogan’s official request for a personal meeting 
in the framework of upcoming Paris Climate Summit was also refused by the Russian 
President. 
In response, Erdogan accused Russia of violation Turkish airspace and, according to Turkish 
authorities, the matter of apology should be on the political agenda of Russia, not on Turkish 
one. In an exclusive interview with CNN Erdogan announced: “I think if there is a party that 
needs to apologize, it is not us. Those who violated our airspace are the ones who need to 
apologize. Our pilots and our armed forces, they simply fulfilled their duties, which consisted 
of responding to ... violations of the rules of engagement. I think this is the essence”.94 
                                                 
93 “Russia: Putin says still no apology from Turkey over downed plane”, Russia Today, Nov 26, 2015 
(translated by the author from Russian)  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e9M-loVR-Gc 
94 CNN's Becky Anderson interview with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Nov 26, 
2015https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tZ1knk5v38 
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Furthermore, in  the meeting with community leaders in Ankara, Erdogan emphasized: “If 
the same violation occurs today, Turkey has to react the same way”.95 Turkey assertively 
claimed that the plane had flown over the Turkish airspace for 17 seconds ignoring ten times 
warnings, although this argument was contested by the Russian side many times. 
Although Erdogan took a robust position not to apologize, which means not to give in to 
Russian demands and it was Ankara’s right to defend its airspace, after some days of this 
speech the Turkish president softened his heated rhetoric a little, saying the episode had 
saddened him. The change in rhetoric was obviously noticeable in Erdogan’s interview given 
to France 24, where he claimed new argument that Turkish jets did not know that the SU-24 
was a Russian jet, otherwise they would have acted differently and would solve the situation 
in another way.96 However, the justifying expressions were not enough and could not be 
replaced by the official apology of Turkey which Russia had required. Instead, Turkish 
Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu declared: “We don’t need to apologize on an occasion 
on which we are right”,97 but also mentioned that during the conversation with his Russian 
counterpart Sergei Lavrov: “We said on the phone that we are sorry”.98 The same announced 
Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu  during a press conference at the NATO 
headquarters in Brussels: “Protection of our airspace, our border is not only a right but a duty 
for my government and no Turkish premier or president will apologize (for) doing our duty”, 
and regarding the Russian sanctions Davutoglu continued: “We hope Russia will reconsider 
these measures in both our interests”.99  
Second, Russian demanded to punish those who are responsible for killing the Russian pilot 
by conducting an objective investigation.  In response to it, in  April, the commander of the 
                                                 
95 “If the same violation occurs today, Turkey has to react the same way”, ILKHA News Agency, Istanbul, 
Nov 27, 2015 http://www.en.ilkha.com/haber/612/if-the-same-violation-occurs-today-turkey-has-to-react-the-
same-way 
96 “Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan says Putin has not returned his call”, Reuters, Nov 27, 2015, cited in The 
Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2015/nov/27/turkey-recep-tayyip-erdogan-putin-wont-return-his-
calls-video 
97 “No need to apologize when we are right, says Turkish FM”, Hürriyet Daily News,  Nov 26, 2015  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/no-need-to-apologize-when-we-are-right-says-turkish-fm-91720 
98 ibid 
99 “Turkish PM: We will not apologize for downing Russian jet”, Agence France Presse, Nov 30, 2015, cited 
in The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/turkish-pm-we-will-not-apologize-for-downing-russian-
jet/ 
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militia group, Alpalsran Celik, who was suspected for killing the Russian pilot, was arrested 
on charges of the criminal possession and carrying of weapons. Shortly after that, he has been 
reelased and the charge of murder against him was withdrawn by the prosecutor due to  
“insufficient evidence”, despite Russian demands many times to conduct a transparent and 
objective investigation.100 In this way, Ankara manifests its unwillingness to accept any fault 
and did not give in to Russian demands. 
Third, Russia demanded to provide reparations for damages suffered by Russia. In response 
to this, the Turkish prime minister Binali Yildirim declared that Turkey will not pay 
compensation to Russia over the downing of a fighter jet.101 
Fourth, unlike abovementioned demands which hold symbolic character, the substantive 
matter for foreign policy concessions is that  Russia demanded from Turkey is to reconsider 
its policy in Syria. In his statement regarding the Turkish behavior, the Chairman of Russia’s 
Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs, Konstantin Kosachev also mentioned that  
“in order to re-start dialogue and have good relations with Russia, Turkey needs to 
reformulate its foreign policy towards Syria and Iraq”.102 This, in particular, assumes, firstly, 
stopping any support to “terrorists” and rebels fighting in Aleppo, and, secondly, readiness 
by Turkish side to engage in a renewed dialogue over accommodating its stances with Russia 
over Syrian crisis regulation.  
In  response, Erdogan made clear that the Turkish policy would not change in Syria and the  
demands dictated by Russia were unrealistic due to their diverging positions on sensitive 
political issues, including Syria. Moreover, Erdogan openly blamed Russia for not fighting 
against ISIS and, actually, for supporting Assad’s “terrorist state” in Syria and his regime at 
all costs.103 The head of the state did not lose any chance to repeat again and again that 
actually Russia under the pretext of fighting against ISIS, mainly targeted the Syrian 
                                                 
100 “Moscow wants Turkey to objectively investigate killing of the Russian pilot”, Sputnik International, May 
5, 2016 https://sputniknews.com/politics/201605121039528921-su24-pilot-killing-investigation/ 
101 “Turkey will not compensate Russia over shooting down of  jet”, Agence France Presse, June 28, 2016, cited 
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moderate opposition. Later Erdogan detailed: “Only Syrian Turkmen who are our relatives 
are living in that region. They are ostensibly striking against Daesh but they are hitting Syrian 
Turkmen and Syrian Turkmen are trying to defend their land”.104  
The escalation reached its peak when Russia’s deputy defense minister Anatoly Antonov 
showed  diplomats and foreign press representatives satellite images of the Turkish-Syrian 
border and accused Turkey of buying stolen oil (approximately 200.000 tons of oil a day 
from Syria and Iraq)  from Islamic State and augmented that Erdogan was personally 
involved in this “criminal business”.105 In turn, Putin blamed Erdogan and his government of 
contributing to the rise of the Islamic State through purchasing smuggled oil,106 despite 
Ankara’s vociferous rejections.  
To conclude, leaders of both countries locked in “a war of words” since the incident had 
taken place and de facto the diplomatic relations between two countries disrupted. Although, 
after the imposition of the sanctions by Russia, Turkish officials changed their rhetoric to 
some extent, there was no change in substance. They did not give in to Russian either 
symbolic or substantive demands (for an official apology, for a trial of the culprit responsible 
for killing the Russian pilot, for paying compensations to Russia over downing Russian jet 
and finally, for reconsidering its policy in Syria). In the time period starting from the 
imposition of sanctions until the coup, no concessions were made by Turkey, it did not give 
in to Russian demands. This means that the sanctions imposed by Russia did not result in the 
desired foreign policy concessions. In terms of the effectiveness for achieving  foreign policy 
concessions, the Russian sanctions were ineffective. 
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4.2.2. Turkey`s response after the coup attempt: concessions 
Whereas in the period before the coup, no concessions were made, this drastically changed 
when separate groups within the armed forces initiated the coup attempt.  Not willingness of 
Turkish authorities to make a formal apology for downing the Russian jet, which had 
symbolic character, put the end to the diplomatic relations between two countries. After the 
imposition of sanctions by Russia, Turkey made clear that it is not going to give in to the 
demands made by Russia, although the following contradictory justifications and comparably 
softened rhetoric were pursuing the aim to mitigate the tension.  
The situation dramatically changed and Turkey suddenly gave in to Russia’s demands seven 
months later. Soon after the coup attempt, Turkish President sent an apology letter to Putin, 
for satisfying Russia’s demands. In his apology letter, Erdogan described Russia as a friend 
and strategic companion for Turkey and emphasized more than once that the Turkish 
authorities had not ever had a wish to ruin the relations with Russia and, particularly, they 
had not any intention of the shooting downing the Russian jet.107 Also, the Turkish President 
expressed his deep regret and condolences to the Russian pilot’s family for the death and 
used the word of apology in the lines of his official letter: “(I) am saying: “Excuse us.” I share 
their grief with all my heart. We look on this Russian pilot’s family as we would a Turkish 
family and we are ready to undertake any initiative that could lessen the pain and severity 
of the damage caused”.108 In addition to that, Erdogan expressed the readiness of the Turkish 
side to do all necessary steps to recover friendly relations that both countries had before the 
incident and to work together with Russia to react to the crisis situations existing in the region 
and struggling against terrorism. In other words, it was the remarkable concession from the 
Turkish side to engage in dialogue concerning political sensitive issues. One of the pivotal 
questions was whether that letter would be accepted by Kremlin as a crucial step in foreign 
policy or it had lost its significance and value over time. After some days of receiving the 
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apology letter from Turkey, President Putin had a short phone conversation with Erdogan, 
and two leaders had contacted together via phone for the first time since the warplane 
incident. So, “the letter diplomacy” worked immediately and opened new prospects for 
further normalization of relations between two countries. Initially, the meeting of both 
leaders was planned at G20 Summit in China, but Erdogan’s persistent request for the urgent 
meeting in the nearest future received a positive response from the Kremlin. Later, Putin’s 
foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov stressed the fact that extremely big efforts put by 
Erdogan to meet with Putin in St. Petersburg was the evidence that Turkish side had given 
high importance to the restoration of relations with Russia.109 It was also obvious that this 
initiative taken by Turkish side would be followed by substantive foreign policy concessions. 
The visit to St. Petersburg in August was Erdogan’s first direct meeting with President Putin 
since the shooting downing of a Russian jet, and it was also his first trip abroad after the coup 
attempt. “Your visit today, despite a very difficult situation regarding domestic politics, 
indicates that we all want to restart dialogue and restore relations between Russia and 
Turkey,”110 said Putin immediately after the handshaking. While Ankara apparently made 
steps for improving relations with Moscow, Russia preserved more pragmatic approach. 
During the whole meeting, Erdogan praised Putin “Dear friend”, obviously showing his 
current attitude towards the Russian president and Russia as a “friendly” country. Following 
the meeting in St. Petersburg, two leaders held a joint conference. As it was supposed, the 
political discourse changed broadly into economic discourse.  The Turkish President stressed 
at the conference that Turkey had a great desire to return the relations with Russia “to pre-
crisis level or even to a better position” by cooperating in various spheres, especially, in the 
areas of energy projects.111 Because of the shoot downing of Russian warplane, Gazprom 
suspended the project which, according to Leonid Grigoriev, a chief Kremlin adviser on 
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energy issues, would have given Turkey “economic development, because it’s a big 
construction project, plus a very important role in Europe as a hub, plus discounts on gas”.112 
In turn, Rosatom also halted the construction works of the nuclear power station which was 
designed to cut the Turkish dependency on imported energy. However, at this time the 
Turkish side indicated the concrete steps which they were going to take for renewing the 
cooperation in those areas. The head of Turkey emphasized that Turkish side were ready to 
give strategic investment status to the Akkayu project and, additionally, vowed to implement 
Turkish Stream natural pipeline project, opening a new strategic route for Russian gas for 
exporting to Europe. Erdogan still views the gas transit as an instrument to gain leverage 
towards the EU and obsesses about the idea of transferring Turkey into “gas hub”. For Putin, 
it is the only real way to eliminate gas transit through Ukraine and to lock Ankara into a deep 
asymmetric cooperation. That’s why Putin always stresses the energy as being the top priority 
in their cooperation. Speaking mainly about the pre-crisis economic ties and how the Russian 
economic sanctions negatively damaged the separate sectors of the Turkish economy, 
Erdogan considered vital for restoring economic ties urgently. Besides, Russia’s economy 
also experienced hard times due to EU sanctions with regard to the Ukrainian crisis and low 
prices of oil. Both sides made the decision to draft a midterm program for economic, technical 
and scientific cooperation for the upcoming three years.  
In response to Russia’s second demand, the legal investigation against suspected murderer 
(Alpalsran Celik) of the Russian pilot was reopened and the legal proceedings resumed.113 
The court immediately ruled that he will remain in custody until the mid of the next year. 
Moreover, the pilots who were involved in downing Russian jet have been arrested by 
Turkish authorities in connection with the aborted coup. Such attitude is also explained by a 
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desire of Erdogan through the usage of the coup attempt as a pretext to manifest his not 
personal involvement in ordering the shooting down of the Russian jet.114  
In regard to the third demand, Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalim announced 
about Ankara’s readiness to discuss the matter of compensation for the relatives of the killed 
Russian pilot in order to mitigate their pain to some extent.115 Moreover, the Turkish Foreign 
Minister said that he wants personally to meet, apologize and provide financial support to the 
widow of Oleg Peshkov.116 Although a brother of the killed Russian pilot, informed that they 
will not accept any material compensation from the Turkish government, the widow of killed 
pilot informed that she was ready to meet with the Turkish Foreign Minister to accept his 
personal apology and condolences.117  
The most crucial precondition - substantive concession - is Russia’s demand to reconsider 
Turkish foreign policy in Syria, which assumes firstly, stopping any support to “terrorists”, 
also rebels in Aleppo fighting to topple Assad and secondly, engaging in a renewed dialogue 
in order to accommodate its stances with Russia over Syrian crisis regulation. In response to 
this key demand, Turkey halted supporting the groups in Syria which Russia considers 
terrorists. For example, Ankara has remarkably changed its stance on the al-Nusra 
Front militants. Ankara and Moscow agreed to consider also moderate opposition forces as 
“terrorist’s accomplices” if they do not get away from the zones controlled by the terrorists. 
This means that Turkey tried to bridge its position closer to Russia apparently departing from 
its previous stance and took a more supportive position of Russia. For the first time, Ankara 
announced Russia’s key role in achieving Syria’s peace process, although the disagreements 
on how to solve the Syrian crisis still existed. “Without Russia’s participation, it’s impossible 
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to find a solution to the Syrian problem. Only in partnership with Russia will we be able to 
settle the crisis in Syria”,118 said Erdogan in the interview to TASS. This was also evaluated 
as the remarkable concession by the Turkish side. Although during their first meeting day in 
Petersburg, both countries leaders skirted out the Syrian issue, mainly discussing their 
interested-based economic cooperation areas and their further developments, just days after 
this meeting, Turkey suggested Russia carry out joint operations in Syria for fighting against 
Islamic State. In a live interview on NTV television Turkish foreign minister announced 
about the readiness of Turkish side to join Russian airstrike campaign in Syria against 
“common enemy”, putting aside their diverging interests on the Syrian crisis and seeking any 
common ground for solutions of hot issues. Cavusoglu said: “We will discuss all the details. 
We have always called on Russia to carry out anti-Daesh operations together”, and then 
continued: “Let's fight against the terrorist group together so that we can clear it out as soon 
as possible”.119 It would not only open the prospects for the rearrangement of strategic powers 
in the turbulent region but also for getting rid of criticism addressed to Turkey by the Western 
partners for not playing a full role in the fight against Islamic State.  
After the seven-month military impasse, Turkey directly intervened in Syria by Russia’s 
“permission”, holding a much more supportive position towards Russia. The first 
intervention (Euphrates Shield Operation in northern Syria) after the failed coup targeted 
mainly IS fighters and a Syrian Kurdish led alliance that was trying to advance on strategic 
border town Jarablus.120 The following interventions showed that Turkey changed its 
priorities in Syria more focusing on both ISIS and Kurdish militants. “By August 2016, in a 
major policy turnaround, Turkey abandoned its absolutist position on the removal of Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad”, and some months after Turkey’s deputy Prime Minister Mehmet 
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Simsek stated that “Turkey could no longer “insist on a settlement without Assad”, which  
opened opportunities  to coordinate with Russia and Iran on a diplomatic solution to the 
Syrian crisis.121 This means that Turkey accepted the new rules of the game in Syria framed 
by Russia by essentially departing from its previous stance and by making substantive 
concessions in regard to accommodation its stance over Syria with Russia. Moreover, 
Moscow and Ankara started to act as similarly as possible in the future having the main goal 
to settle the Syrian crisis together. Therefore, Turkey increasingly changed its Syrian policy 
within several months following the coup attempt through foreign policy remarkable 
concessions, simultaneously trying to strengthen its “anti-Kurdish alliance” with Iran for 
blocking the emergence of a “Kurdish corridor” on its Syrian border.  
In response to his St. Petersburg meeting, Erdogan invited Putin to Istanbul to participate in 
the 23rd  World Energy Congress, in the framework of which an intergovernmental agreement 
was signed for the Turkish Stream Natural Gas Pipeline Project. As it is informed by the 
Turkish  Presidential website, the meeting was very productive in terms of normalization of 
Turkey-Russia relations and that process it will progress swiftly.122 So, the leaders of both 
countries found each other to have appeared on the same side. The relations between both 
countries entered into the rapprochement phase and steadily took the direction towards pre-
crisis level. Although, both leaders found rational to manifest mutual respect and new 
friendliness, apparently the trust between them had been lost for a long term.  
Russia’s positive reaction to Erdogan’s overture made clear that at least both leaders would 
take advantage of using each other as levers in arranging their relations with the West and 
the US, especially over Syrian issue. Turkey would get both economic and political benefits. 
Erdogan used normalization of relations with Russia in order to: first, to lift economic 
sanctions for reviving Turkish economy, in particular, for realization nuclear and energy 
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strategic projects, second, to balance Turkey’s relationships with the EU and the US, third, 
to manifest Kurds Turkish strategic partnership with Russia and in future to strengthen its 
“anti-Kurdish alliance” with Iran and, finally, to find common resolution with Russia over 
Syrian crisis. The Turkish leader realized the impossibility of solving Syrian issue without 
Russia due to its being a key actor in the Middle East.  
As shown in this section, the previous Turkish position of making no concession in face of 
the Russian sanctions, following the coup attempt, this position was quickly changed, which 
meant Turkey giving in to all demands (to differing degrees) made by Moscow. Erdogan 
made the official apology, the legal investigation in regard to killing the Russian pilot was 
reopened, Turkey expressed a willingness to discuss the compensation issue and even 
suggested some compensations the dead pilot’s family and notably, Turkey reconsidered its 
Syrian policy considerably. The latter suggested Russia carry out joint operations in fighting 
against Islamic state and even more, during that time Turkey changed its foreign policy 
priorities in Syria.   
What this showed in the second period, after the coup attempt, Russia’s sanctions were 
effective, they did lead to the desired foreign policy concessions from Turkey. In order to 
explain this sudden turnaround, the following section elucidates the factors which led to this 
change, which led to Turkey giving in to Russia’s demands. 
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4.3. Domestic instability and international isolation before and after the coup attempt 
 
In this section, I am going to measure “the level of vulnerability” through a) domestic 
instability and b) “international isolation”. Assuming that the level of vulnerability mediates 
the effect of sanctions on foreign policy concessions, here I am looking whether a change in 
vulnerability can explain the observed sudden turnaround in Turkey’s responsiveness to 
Russian sanctions. I begin by assessing the change in “domestic stability” induced by 
increasing number of terrorist attacks, a new cycle of Turkey’s PKK conflict, the coup 
attempt, following three months state of emergency and massive purges during that period. 
Thereafter, second, I assess the degree of “international isolation” following the coup. 
Already sanctioned Turkish economy was struggling with political volatility. “The cycle of 
violence has marked, perhaps, the most turbulent year in Turkey's modern history”.123 Turkey 
has collided with large-scale and repeated terrorist attacks prepared mainly by “Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL/Daesh), the “Kurdistan Workers’ Party” (PKK) and the PKK-
affiliated (attacks by organizations that have declared allegiance to PKK) “Kurdistan 
Freedom Hawks” (TAK) which have caused hundreds of  victims in Ankara, Istanbul, Bursa, 
Suruç, or Diyarbakır, following massive protests in the aftermath of those bloody events. 
Besides, the border city of Kilis has been under continuous rocket attacks by ISIS from the 
Syrian territory in April which became so-called “terror zone” and the reason of fleeing 
dozens of inhabitants. Despite widespread accusations of Turkey’s involvement in 
supporting IS and jihadist militants, Turkey was shelling both IS inside northern Syria and 
the Kurdish fighters of Popular Protection Units (YPG). The latter was also fighting for the 
Kurdish autonomy for decades. From the Turkish perspective, those Kurdish fighters were a 
direct threat to their national security. On the other hand, the US and Russia actively 
supported  Kurdish rebel groups124 which were eager to maintain their control along the 
Turkish-Syrian border, considering them as one of the effective forces on the ground in the 
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fight against IS. Moreover, Kremlin had given the Syrian Kurds permission to open a 
diplomatic representative office in Moscow.125  
The clashes between PKK (which were internationally listed as a terrorist organization) and 
Turkey’s security forces, in particular, southeastern Turkey, where most of Turkey’s ethnic 
Kurds live, caused hundreds of causalities on both sides. The Turkish security forces also 
attacked the Kurdish civilians living there. By the estimations of  Amnesty International: “It 
is likely that at least half a million people have been forcibly displaced by the violence, large-
scale destruction of property and by ongoing curfews in areas across the south-east”.126 
According to International Crisis Group: “the PKK conflict has entered one of the deadliest 
chapters in its three-decade history. Over the past year, more than 1700 people have been 
killed”.127 As noted  Fuat Keyman, the director of Istanbul Policy Center,  the internal 
stability of Turkey mainly depends on how Turkey and PKK relations would develop in 
future and which role Turkey should play in the Middle East and against ISIL, stressing also 
that unfeasible to detach Turkish foreign policy from its internal issues. “(T)urkey must 
engage as a soft power (supporting civil society and playing roles in humanitarian affairs and 
negotiations) instead of just acting as a buffer for conflict”.128 
The chain of  IS attacks in 2016 changed its character since they were not mainly addressed 
to Kurdish targets but regularly directed against the Turkish society. The suicide bombings 
in Istanbul in January and March 2016, terrorist attacks in Ankara in February and in 
Gaziantep in May, Ataturk airport attack in June of the same year, the assassination of the 
Russian ambassador in Turkey in December and large-scale purges of security forces resulted 
in considerable deterioration of security situation in the state.   In terms of figures, the number 
of politically motivated terrorist attacks in 2016 compared to the previous year had 
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dramatically increased in Turkey. According to START, (The National Consortium for the 
study of terrorism and responses to terrorism) only in the first half of 2016, it was accounted 
around three hundred attacks.129 The entire 2016 was unprecedented with the number of 
around five hundred forty terrorist attacks130 and political upheavals. Although terrorist 
attacks carried out by ISIL were essentially centered in Iraq and Syria, Turkey appeared 
among those countries in 2016 with the number of fifty-six terrorist attacks carried out only 
by ISIL.131 According to another data presented by the World Bank, the political stability 
index of Turkey is the worst in 2016 compared with the previous 10 years. It has dropped 0.5 
compared with 2015, reaching to -2 point. The average value for Turkey during that period 
is -1.03 points with a minimum of -2 points in 2016 and a maximum of -0.59 point in 2006.132 
This is also an average of different indexes from the World Economic Forum, and the 
Political Risk Services and so on. So, in 2016 Turkey appeared among top ten countries in 
the world with its weak political stability leaving ahead only Burundi, Congo,  Libya, Iraq, 
Somalia, Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria.133 This means that already in the 
time period preceding the coup, there was a degree of domestic instability with numerous 
terrorist attacks, growing autocracy of the Turkish leadership, launched assaults in Kurdish 
regions by the Turkish government. Yet, even while there were these domestic troubles, 
Erdogan was firmly in power, he did not see any serious challenge to him and did not perceive 
himself and his government under the direct threat domestically. From this position of 
relative domestic stability, the terrorist threat notwithstanding, it was possible for the Turkish 
leadership to rebuff Russian demands, even when enforced with economic sanctions. Even 
when sanctions hit Turkey, in spite of economic costs, this simply did not lead to a situation 
in which the government’s power was seriously threatened. Despite Turkey’s domestic issues 
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and strained relations with the EU, at no point was the government/Erdogan’s rule in danger. 
Therefore, vulnerability before the attempted coup was low. This markedly changed with the 
coup when the level of domestic instability reached its peak.  
Factions within the armed forces initiated the coup attempt. For the first time, the Parliament 
of the Republic was shelled by coup plotters as well as other state and civilian infrastructures. 
Their tanks moved to Ankara and Istanbul to seize control of the Bosporus Bridge. The 
common people who had gone out in the streets faced down the tanks and was able to partially 
put down the coup attempt. During the clashes of that bloody night, 246 people were killed 
and 2194 were injured.134 The government blamed Fethullah Gulen for masterminding the 
coup who lives in exile in the US and who, according to the Turkish current authorities, has 
had a huge network of adherents infiltrated Turkish institutions for decades. During several 
days, tens of thousands of state workers, in particular, from security, military forces and 
judicial system had been arrested or dismissed based on allegations of links to Gulen’s 
network or threat to the national security. 
Under the announcement a three-month state of emergency by the Turkish president in the 
aftermath of the aborted coup, unprecedented purges were launched. “ Nearly 90,000 servants 
were dismissed; hundreds of media outlets and NGOs were closed down and journalists, 
activities, and MPs were detained”.135 Holding emergency powers for a long-term gave the 
president and his cabinet a chance to make the new laws bypassing the parliament. Hence, 
under the pretext of involvement in the failed coup, the government organized massive 
purges to finally get rid of or at least to silence the opponents and critics of the current Turkish 
authorities. Moreover, Erdogan signaled the death penalty reinstatement which was 
abrogated by the country in 2004 as part of its bid for becoming EU member. The domestic 
instability in Turkey much more aggravated after the aborted coup attempt, and the difference 
before and after the coup attempt was within the level of intensity. Whereas already before 
the coup there were domestic difficulties, especially related to terrorism, they were not of 
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such large scale or gravity that they would have endangered Erdogan`s rule. At no moment 
did it appear that his rule was seriously in danger. Therefore, the vulnerability of the 
government was not particularly high. 
The second element by which vulnerability can be assessed is international isolation. In the 
aftermath of the coup, Turkey came under heavy international pressure both from 
international organizations and from traditional its partners and allies. They harshly criticized 
the sweeping measures taken by the Turkish president and recorded numerous deviations 
from the various Conventions and International legal documents, calling for the Turkish 
authorities to put the end to the massive crackdowns. The Council of Europe’s  Commissioner 
of Human Rights presented special Memorandum136 regarding the existing urgent situation 
in Turkey where he stressed  about nearly unlimited discretionary powers for the Turkish 
administrative authorities and the executive, a huge number of violations of the general 
principles of rule of  law and human rights, etc, strongly urging the Turkish authorities to 
revert to the situation before the state emergency, to follow the guidance  of the Council of 
the Europe regarding human rights and without  delay to implement recommendations of the 
CPT addressed to them.137 In their joint statement, the European Union’s foreign policy chief 
Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn reminded that European Union 
condemned with concern the developments regarding the State of Emergency in Turkey, 
considering them totally unacceptable and stressing the significance of prevailing rule of law, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the state.138 Despite the condemnations of the 
coup attempt by NATO’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, he stressed the vital importance 
to guarantee full respect for constitutional order,  the rule of law and fundamental freedoms 
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by Turkey.139 Similarly, EU Foreign ministers and Secretary of State John Kerry called on 
Erdogan to move in a way to respect rule of law and fundamental rights.140 
Erdogan’s authoritarianism and the situation in the country had vexed the EU and its leaders’ 
before the coup attempt as well, but the block’s all criticism was moderated due to Turkey’s 
role as an ally in Syria, confronting with Russia and as a door-keeper of migrants on a migrant 
way to Europe. After the refugee deal, there was trouble that the EU was turning a blind eye 
to human rights abuses in the country.  However, the unprecedented scale of crackdowns and 
restoration of new friendship with Russia rattled the Western leaders and changed the rhetoric 
of  EU officials’ statements. Instead, Erdogan viewed the migration deal as a leverage of 
manipulation towards the West both before and after the aborted coup, since the West needed 
Turkey much more at that point than Turkey the West. In exchange for curbing the flow of 
migrants from Syria and other countries into Western Europe, Turkey was expecting visa-
free travel to Schengen zone of its citizens and “re-energizing of the accession process”. 
Instead, soon after the joint statement on refugee deal, the Turkish government refused to 
amend a counter-terrorism law of the country, which was one of the key demand for granting 
visa-free travel within Schengen zone, considering it vital tool in order to confront with the 
threat of Kurdish and Islamic terrorism at home and also  indicating it was in the midst of an 
operation against Kurdish militants. Moreover, the Turkish officials and Erdogan threatened 
the West to reopen Turkey’s borders to Europe for migrants and refugees if the EU  failed 
not to implement its part of the deal. Erdogan’s comments were becoming more and more 
harsh towards Europe, reaching the level of absurdness. The West’s comments towards the 
Turkish authorities were merely strained due to several political factors, but after the coup 
attempt, those became proportional responses to the Turkish side, including warnings about 
suspending negotiations on EU accession, and even about cutting diplomatic ties with 
Turkey. Those comments resulted in a sharp deterioration in ties with the European Union, 
which Turkey was still eager to join. In other words, “Rapidly distancing itself from the 
European values”141 widened the cliff between the West and Turkey, and Turkey conceived 
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itself marginalized by the West.  This means that, in terms of international isolation, Turkey’s 
vulnerability increased strongly. 
Similarly, vulnerability also increased due to deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the US 
in the aftermath of the coup, further increasing the country’s “international isolation”. The 
relations with the US were also uneasy for Turkey since the US supported the alliance 
between YPG and some Syrian Arabs called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which were 
taking control over strategic areas from different armed Islamist groups. Syrian Kurds were 
expanding their areas of the operation aimed at taking control of border towns and further to 
unite them for creating autonomous enclave along the Syrian-Turkish border, which was 
viewed by Turkey as a direct threat to its national security and as a failing of plans of creating 
“buffer zone”. If the PKK is officially considered a terrorist organization by the US and the 
West, the same did not spread over YPG, which had obtained the trust of Turkey’s 
international allies in the fight against IS, despite Turkey’s bombardments of the YPG targets. 
Already strained relations became much more complicated when after the coup the US 
refused the Turkish side’s demand to extradite F. Gulen, who was blamed for masterminding 
the coup in Turkey. Instead, the US demanded shreds of evidence and not allegations from 
Turkey. Besides, Turkey’s unpredictable foreign policy over Syria, including the downing of 
the Russian jet tightened the relations between Turkey and NATO. Tensions became salient 
when NATO reacted to dismissals of hundreds of senior military staff serving with NATO 
in Europe and the United States, and when NATO officers appeared among thousands of 
Turks seeking asylum in Germany.  
The tensions were not limited to the US, NATO, Russia and the West. Before it, Turkey had 
already spoiled the relations with Arab states, which resulted in growing challenges not only 
for the Turkish politics but for the economy as well. The key former trade partner for Turkey 
was Egypt which great market was closed for Turkey due to non-recognition of current 
authorities as legitimate rulers after the overthrow of Muslim Brotherhood. The relations 
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soured with Libya as well, since the Libyan government blamed Turkey for providing arms 
to the  Islamist groups and announced about expelling around 180 Turkish companies from 
Libya, also calling for all Turks to leave the country.142 The Turkish foreign policy also 
confronted with Iran over regional issues, starting from Turkey’s solid stance on the removal 
of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, support of different Islamist groups, ending with  
Turkey’s serious worry about Iran’s spreading influence over Bahrain, Yemen, and 
Lebanon.143 The practice of recalling ambassadors to Ankara over last few years became 
common phenomenon mainly due to bilateral political tension and security concerns in those 
countries. At that period, Turkey had no ambassadors in neighboring countries such as Syria, 
Egypt, Israel, Libya, Yemen and the list can be continued with European countries as well. 
“A foreign policy predicated on an agenda that misjudged, or blatantly disregarded, the 
realities on the ground, pushed Turkey into considerable isolation in the Arab world. Not 
only has Ankara withdrawn a number of diplomatic missions, but Turkish businessmen have 
also become personae non-grate across the region – and in return, Turkey seems to have 
squandered away its credentials as a reliable partner”.144 The political loneliness of Turkey 
showed how Turkish foreign policy had a fiasco or at least failed on numerous fronts. 
Davutoglu’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy slogan for Turkey turned into the 
problems with all neighbors in the region, in some cases,  into “zero trade” as well. The 
removal from the political arena the author of this slogan, who failed to bring it into life, 
seemed like the first step towards changing the further situation.  
In conclusion, the assessment of the vulnerability of Turkey before and after the coup attempt 
shows that even though there were some issues, both with regard to domestic stability and 
with international isolation, Turkey’s vulnerability on both dimensions dramatically 
increased after the coup attempt. Domestically, the government had to struggle for its power; 
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and internationally, Turkey became isolated. What we witness is, therefore, a drastic increase 
in vulnerability with the coup attempt. Under the impression of the attempted coup, the 
government perceived itself under siege of being removed from power, and internationally, 
the government became isolated from its Western allies. Therefore, after the coup attempt, 
the vulnerability became extremely high. 
This change in vulnerability then explains the above-observed turnaround of Turkey, the 
sudden change in its responsiveness to Russia’s demands. Whereas sanctions stayed same 
over time, and whereas impact and the costs Turkey suffered from them did not abruptly 
change over time, these sanctions, while initially ineffective, nevertheless resulted in 
considerable concessions by Turkey. The economic sanctions imposed by Russia led to 
substantive concessions, once vulnerability of Turkey drastically increased due to the coup. 
Whereas before, the political cost of economic sanctions was acceptable for the Turkish 
leadership, in the aftermath of the coup, the political costs had increased a lot, thus resulting 
in turnaround and change. The effectiveness of Russia’s sanctions in leading to Turkish 
foreign policy concessions can thus be explained by the change in the level of vulnerability. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this study, I set out to explore the conditions determining the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions. Relying on the literature on sanctions, I have then studied the case of Russia’s 
sanctions against Turkey in order to identify which factors led to the Turkish foreign policy 
concessions. More precisely, it investigates the factors behind Turkey’s decision to make 
foreign policy concessions to Russia. For that purpose, I have scrutinized the effectiveness 
of Russian sanctions against Turkey before and after the coup attempt for extrapolating the 
causal link between the economic sanctions, along with target country’s level of vulnerability 
and foreign policy concessions. I provided an assessment of the impact of Russian sanctions 
on the Turkish economy. Then I looked at how the level of vulnerability caused by domestic 
instability and International isolation mediated the effect of the economic sanctions Russia 
had imposed, that is how the level of vulnerability deactivated or activated the effect of 
sanctions and thereby determined whether they would result in concessions.  
The finding of the analysis was that Russian economic sanctions led to substantive 
concessions, once vulnerability of Turkey drastically increased due to the coup attempt. The 
change in Turkish foreign behavior is not the direct effect of sanctions, but they became 
effective tool due to increased vulnerability derived from domestic instability and 
international isolation. In other words, the effect of sanctions is mediated by Turkey’s 
vulnerability. The change in Turkish foreign policy behavior or re-imaging of its foreign 
policy is the result of the sum of economic pressure  (i.e. sanctions) and changing levels of 
vulnerability, which determines the political costs these pressures inflict upon the regime. 
The economic sanctions, accompanying with the growing domestic instability and alienating 
its political allies which led to isolation, undermined the country’s foreign trade and tourism, 
creating challenges for Turkish economy and politics. The magnitude of that shake became 
a determinant for foreign policy concessions. Growing domestic instability and isolation 
became magnified after the coup attempt, granting to economic sanctions a real power of 
coercion. 
The turning point of Turkish foreign policy re-calibration happened when domestic 
instability reached its peak and isolation in the aftermath of the coup emerged. This means 
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sudden, drastic increase in vulnerability. The Government could withstand the dramatic 
impact of the sanctions till the attempt of overthrowing of itself, and after the aborted coup 
Turkey became extremely vulnerable and the political costs were greatly increased. They 
drastically and suddenly increased with the coup attempt. And with this sudden change, also 
the effect of the sanctions suddenly, and drastically increased. This means that the economic 
sanctions alone did not turn into coercive power due to Turkey’s low vulnerability and their 
capacity of generating concessions emerged when they had an exact vector of high 
vulnerability. Moreover, the kind of high vulnerability should have political character or 
background for transferring into real power. The economic sanctions needed solid political 
factors for providing high vulnerability in order to lead to  Turkish foreign policy concession. 
As we viewed in theory (see p. 19), the authoritarian leaders are more keen on ignoring 
economic sanctions even if they hit economy significantly, since they are not worried about 
common people’ s complaints, have many leverages to silence the protests and chance to 
advance their own political ambitions. Although Russia remarkably demonstrated its ability 
to “bleed” many vital sectors of the Turkish economy, the economic sanctions did not 
generate concessions over six months. The cost of strained relations with Russia was high 
since they paralyzed the flourishing cooperation between countries in strategic areas, such as 
trade, tourism, investment, and energy. Although the sanctions were undermining Turkish 
economy, which had already experienced a blockage of markets from the countries of Arab 
States due to Erdogan’s political opposite stances, the Turkish President was unwilling to 
make a rational choice for rescuing Turkey-Russia relations, in particular, to give in Russia’s 
demands and make concessions. Moreover, the Turkish side went beyond with its much 
tough rhetoric and made clear that Turkish foreign policy would not be changed towards 
Russia. However, they can withstand at some level, since when economic sanctions start to 
operate in destabilized political atmosphere, their impact is eroding. 
These findings confirm the hypothesis that the more vulnerable the country, the more 
effective the economic sanctions. This study demonstrated that the level of vulnerability 
defines the conditions under which economic sanctions are effective. When a vulnerability 
is high, then sanctions are effective and, in contrast, when a vulnerability is low, then 
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sanctions are not effective. By demonstrating the mediating role of vulnerability, this study 
supports the argument in the literature on sanctions that facilitating conditions matter.   
The question under which conditions sanctions lead to change in foreign policy of the target 
country can be answered in the following way: under the conditions of low vulnerability the 
economic sanctions are not able to generate concessions, while under the conditions of high 
vulnerability, in particular, provided by domestic instability and isolation, sanctions turned 
into coercive power and generate concessions. The effectiveness of economic sanctions 
increases with the augmentation in the vulnerability of the target country. Sanctions alone 
are necessary but not sufficient preconditions for achieving foreign policy concessions. Their 
effect is mediated by the target country’s vulnerability and international isolation. Especially 
domestic instability thereby maximizes the effectiveness of sanctions. Hence, it is possible 
to conclude that it is only under the permissive conditions of (sufficient) vulnerability that 
economic sanctions are effective.  
As this study has demonstrated, the arguments that sanctions are generally an ineffective tool 
of foreign policy (see p. 13), are too simplistic, since as I have shown it depends on the 
conditions under which economic sanctions can be granted coercive power to generate 
concessions. The findings of this study, therefore, support the arguments by those 
authors145who take a more nuanced view and argue that their effectiveness depending on 
conditioning factors and foreign policy pursued goals (types of demand), however. Since the 
effectiveness of sanctions is an ongoing hot debate on literature, this study contributed to this 
debate by demonstrating the relevance of target country vulnerability. 
Whereas this study contributes to the sanctions literature in this way, these findings could be 
further tested in other cases or settings. Here, the mediating role of vulnerability was tested 
only in the case of Russia’s sanctions against Turkey. In order to confirm the role of 
vulnerability, to generalize these findings, additional studies/other cases would be necessary. 
While a small-N comparative design is considered most useful for answering the research 
question this study has put forward, the generalizability of findings is limited. I am aware of 
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this limitation. While the findings and conclusions apply to the case under consideration, 
their more general validity had to be tested for other cases – which is a task for future studies. 
Large-N studies would give a possibility not only to control levels of vulnerability but also 
to solve “many variables, few cases” methodological problem. Moreover, the level of 
vulnerability could be measured over a long time period through various variables and the 
effects of economic sanctions could also be measured through econometric models which 
would give a more precise picture of the level of vulnerability and its’ interaction with 
concession size.  This study has made a contribution to the debate, but the effectiveness of 
sanctions remains a vital research area which warrants further research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
Literature 
 
 Baldwin D. A.,“The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice”, International Security, 
Winter 1999-2000, Vol. 24, No. 3., pp. 80-107. 
 Baldwin D. A., Economic Statecraft, Princeton University Press, 1985. 
 Bapat N. and Morgan T. C., “Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered”, 
International Studies Quarterly, 2009, Vol. 53, pp. 1075-1094. 
 Barber J., “Economic Sanctions As a Policy Instrument”, International Affairs, July 
1979, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 359-366. 
 Blanchard Jean-Marc F. and Ripsman N., “Asking the Right Questions: When Do 
Economic Sanctions Work Best?” Security Studies, 1999, Vol. 9, Issue 1/2, pp. 219-253. 
 Bolks S. and Al-Sowayel D., “How Long Do Economic Sanctions Last?”, Political 
Research Quarterly, June 2000, Vol. 53, pp. 241-265. 
 Bryan R. E., Busted Sanctions: Explaining why economic sanctions fail, Standford 
University Press, 2015. 
 Globalization and Global Governance, edited by  Raimo Väyrynen (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), April 1999. 
 Dashti-Gibson J., Davis P. and Radcliff B., “On the Determinants of the Success of 
Economic Sanctions”, American Journal of Political Science, 1997, Vol 41, pp. 608-618. 
 Drezner D. W., An analytically eclectic approach to sanctions and non-proliferation, 
Tufts University, 2010. 
 Drezner D. W., “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion”, International Organization, 
Summer 2003, Vol. 57, Issue 3, pp. 643-659. 
 Drezner D. W., The Sanction Paradox: Economic statecraft and International relations, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 Drezner D. W.,“Outside the box: Explaining sanctions in pursuit of foreign economic 
goals”, International interactions, 2001, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 372-410. 
 Drury A. C., Economic sanctions and presidential decisions, models of political 
rationality, Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2005. 
70 
 
 Elliott K. A., “The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?” International 
Security, Summer 1998, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 50-65. 
 Galtung J., “On the effects of international economic sanctions: With examples from the 
case of Rhodesia”, World Politics, April 1967, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 378-416. 
 Gerring J., Case study research: principles and practices, New York, 2007. 
 Haass R. N., “Sanctioning Madness,” Foreign Affairs, November-December 1997, Vol. 
76, No. 6, pp. 74-85 
 Hakimdavar G., A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions, International 
Relations, Law and Development, Taylor & Francis, New York 2014. 
 Hufbauer G. C., Schott J. J., “Economic Sanctions and U. S. Foreign Policy Source”, 
American Political Science Association, Autumn 1985, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 727-735. 
 Hufbauer G. C., Schott J. J., Elliot K. A., Oegg B., Economic sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd 
ed., Washington D.C.: Institute of International Economics, May 2009. 
 James B., “Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument”, International Affairs,1979, Vol. 
55, No. 3, pp. 367-384. 
 Kirisci K., Ekim S., Turkey and EU Relations in Light of Recent Political and Economic 
Developments in the Region, Mediterranean Yearbook, 2016, pp.68-75 
 Kirshner J., “The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions”, Security Studies, 1997, Vol. 
6, No. 3, pp. 32-64. 
 Lacy D., Niou E. S., “A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of 
Preferences, Information, and Threats”, The Journal of Politics, Feb. 2004, Vol. 66, No. 
1, pp. 25-42 
 Lijphart A.,“Comparative politics and the Comparative method”, The American Political 
Science Review, Sept. 1971, Vol 65, No 3, pp. 682-693 
 Lindsay J. M., “Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination”, International 
Studies Quarterly, 1986, Vol. 30, Issue 2, pp. 153-173 
 Malloy M. P., Economic Sanctions and US trade, Canada, 1990. 
 Morgan, T. C. and Schwebach V., “Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions 
in International Crises”, International Studies Quarterly, 1997, Vol. 41, N 1, pp. 27-50. 
71 
 
 Nincic M. and Wallensteen P.,“Economic Coercion and Foreign Policy” in Dilemmas 
of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics, New York: Praeger, 1983. 
 Nossal K. R., Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy, 
Toronto, 1994. 
 On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools, September 2015, Report N25. 
 Pape R. A., “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work”, International Security, Fall 1997, 
Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 90-136. 
 Targeted Sanctions: the impacts and effectiveness of United Nations Actions, Cambridge 
University press, 2016. 
 Toshkov D., Research design in political science, New York, 2016. 
 U-Jin A. A. and Peksen D., “When Do Economic Sanctions Work? Asymmetric 
Perceptions, Issue Salience, and Outcomes”, Political Research Quarterly, March 2007, 
Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 135-145. 
 Wood R. M., “A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation: Economic Sanctions and State 
Repression, 1976-2001”, International Studies Quarterly, September 2008, Vol. 52, 
Issue 3, pp. 489-513. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
Sources 
 Amnesty International report 2016-2017. 
 “Disparities in Sensitivity and Vulnerability in the Liberal System”, The Meridian 
Journal, 2014. https://lcmeridianjournal.com/2014/11/16/disparities-in-sensitivity-and-
vulnerability-in-theliberal-system/ 
 “Erdogan says talks with Putin to open new page in relations: TASS”, Reuters, Aug 7, 
2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-turkey-erdogan/erdogan-says-talks-
with-putin-to-open-new-page-in-relations-tass-idUSKCN10I0PU 
 “Erdogan travels to Russia to reset relations”, Al Jazeera, Aug 9, 2016.  
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/erdogan-travels-russia-reset-relations-
160809032238975.html 
 “EU commissioner says Turkey is distancing itself from European values”, Turkish 
Minute, July 25, 2017. https://www.turkishminute.com/2017/07/25/eu-commissioner-
says-turkey-is-distancing-itself-from-european-values/ 
 “Family of killed Russian pilot to reject compensation from Turkey”, AhlulBayt News  
Agency, July 2, 2016. 
http://en.abna24.com/service/europe/archive/2016/07/02/763654/story.html 
 “If the same violation occurs today, Turkey has to react the same way”, ILKHA News 
Agency, Istanbul, Nov 27, 2015. http://www.en.ilkha.com/haber/612/if-the-same-
violation-occurs-today-turkey-has-to-react-the-same-way 
 “Moscow wants Turkey to objectively investigate killing of the Russian pilot”, Sputnik 
International, May 5, 2016. https://sputniknews.com/politics/201605121039528921-
su24-pilot-killing-investigation/ 
 “No need to apologize when we are right, says Turkish FM”, Hürriyet Daily News, Nov 
26, 2015. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/no-need-to-apologize-when-we-are-right-
says-turkish-fm-91720 
 Observations of the Ministry of Justice of Republic of Turkey concerning the 
memorandum by the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human rights, Ministry of 
Justice Republic of Turkey, Ankara, Oct. 31, 2016. 
73 
 
 “Political stability-country rankings”, The Global Economy.com, 2016. 
https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_political_stability/ 
 “Putin and Erdogan to hold joint press conference in St. Petersburg”, Russia Today, Aug 
9, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UVTah_Io6cM 
 “Russia deploys S-400 and moves guided-missile cruiser off Latakia to protect its jets 
near Turkish border”, The Aviationist, Nov 25, 2015. 
https://theaviationist.com/2015/11/25/all-the-weapons-sensors-moskva/ 
 “Russia: Putin says still no apology from Turkey over downed plane”, Russia Today, 
Nov 26, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e9M-loVR-Gc 
 Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini and 
Commissioner Johannes Hahn on the declaration of the State of Emergency in Turkey, 
Brussels, 21/07/2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/7283_en 
 “Syria: Turkish-backed rebels “seize” Jarablus from ISIL”, Al Jazeera, Aug 25, 2016. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/syria-turkish-backed-rebels-seize-jarablus-
isil-160824162712114.html 
 “Syrian Kurdistan’s diplomatic representative office opened in Moscow”, Ekurd Daily, 
Feb 10, 2016. http://ekurd.net/syrian-kurdistan-office-moscow-2016-02-10 
 “Trial of Suspected Murderer of Russian Su-24 Pilot Begins in Turkey”, Sputnik 
International, July 27, 2016. 
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201606271042008697-turkey-su-24-pilot-
murderer-trial/ 
 “Turkey aims for $100bn trade with Russia by 2023 – Erdogan”, Russia Today, Sep 23, 
2015. https://www.rt.com/business/316308-erdogan-putin-turkey-russia-trade/ 
 “Turkey in 2016: Domestic Politics, EU relations and beyond”, Wilson Center, Jan 21, 
2016. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/turkey-2016-domestic-politics-eu-relations-
and-beyond 
 “Turkey urges Russia to back joint operations against IS in Syria”, Al-Monitor, Aug 11, 
2016. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2016/08/syria-conflict-russia-turkey.html 
74 
 
 “Turkey v Syria’s Kurds v Islamic State”, BBC, Aug 23, 2016. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33690060 
 “Turkey will not compensate Russia over shooting down of  jet”, Agence France 
Presse, June 28, 2016, cited in The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/28/turkey-prepared-to-compensate-
russia-over-shooting-down-of-jet 
 Turkey: Displaced and disposed-Sur residents’ right to return home, Amnesty 
International, (EUR.44.5213.2106), 2016. 
 “Turkey: Political stability”, The Global Economy.com, 2016. 
https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Turkey/wb_political_stability/ 
 Turkey’s Contracting Services Abroad, Turkish Contractors Association, March 2017. 
http://tmb.org.tr/doc/file/YDMH_march_2017.pdf 
 “Turkey’s PKK conflict: The death troll”, International Crisis Group, July 20, 2016. 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-
asia/westerneuropemediterranean/turkey/turkey-s-pkk-conflict-death-toll 
 “Turkey's Erdogan: “Everyone should respect the right of Turkey to defend its borders””, 
Reuters, Nov 24, 2015, cited in Jerusalem Post. http://www.jpost.com/Middle-
East/Turkeys-Erdogan-Everyone-should-respect-the-right-of-Turkey-to-defend-its-
borders-435240 
 “Turkey's snuggling up to Russia is likely to hurt it”, The Economist, Feb 16, 2017. 
https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21717080-putin-and-erdogan-expect-
different-and-contradictory-things-their-relationship-turkeys 
 “Turkish FM Cavusoglu ready to personally apologize to downed Su-24 Pilot’s 
widow”, Sputnik International, Nov 2, 2016. 
https://sputniknews.com/world/201611021046991729-cavusoglu-su24-pilot-widow-
apology/ 
 “Turkish PM: We will not apologize for downing Russian jet”, Agence France Presse, 
Nov 30, 2015, cited in The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/turkish-pm-
we-will-not-apologize-for-downing-russian-jet/ 
75 
 
 Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline project signed, Presidency of Republic Turkey, 
Oct. 10, 2016. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/53556/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-
rusya-devlet-baskani-putin-ile-gorustu.html 
 Vladimir Putin received a letter from President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan, July 
27, 2016. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52282 
 “Widow of downed Su-24 Pilot ready to personally accept Turkish FM’ apologies”, 
Sputnik International, Nov 3, 2016. 
https://sputniknews.com/world/201611031047041774-su-24-widow-cavusoglu/ 
 CNN's Becky Anderson interview with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Nov 
26, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tZ1knk5v38 
 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human rights, Memorandum of the human rights 
implications of the measures taken under the state of emergency in Turkey, Strasbourg, 
Oct 7, 2016. 
 Demir E., “Possible implications of Russia’s sanctions on Turkish economy”, Analytic 
Report, Bankazi, Dec 2015. 
 Executive Order of the President Vladimir Putin N669, Dec 12, 2015.  
http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/40335 
 Executive Order of the President Vladimir Putin N583, Nov 28, 2015  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50805 
 Friedman G., “ Were Turkish Coup Planners Involved In Downing Russian Jet?” 
HuffPost, 2016. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/george-friedman/were-turkish-coup-
planner_b_11084900.html 
 Gazprom Export official website: http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/ 
 Graham D., “Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr and the Forgotten Shiites of Saudi Arabia”, The 
Atlantic, Jan 5, 2016. www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/nimr-al-nimr-
saudi-arabia-shiites/422670/ 
 Hubfauer G. C., “Trade as a weapon”, San Diego State University, World Peace Week, 
April 12-18, 1999. http://zoww.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer0499.htm 
 Hufbauer G.C. and Oegg B., “Targeted sanction: A policy alternative?”, Paper for a 
symposium on “Sanctions Reform? Evaluating the Economic Weapon in Asia and the 
76 
 
World”, Institute for International Economics, 23 Feb. 2000. 
https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/targeted-sanctions-policy-alternative 
 Interview with Turkish vice premier Mehmet Simsek, NTV, Dec 9, 2015. 
 Kanter J., “E.U. and U.S. Urge Erdogan to Show Restraint After Coup Attempt in 
Turkey”, The New York Times, July 18, 2016. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/world/europe/eu-turkey-coup-erdogan.html 
 Luhn A., “Russia steps up hostility against Turkey with war room briefing”, The 
Guardian, Dec 2, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/02/russia-steps-
up-hostility-against-turkey-with-war-room-briefing-in-kremlin 
 Mirovalev M., “Russians pay the price of new anti-Turkish measures”, Al Jazeera, Dec 
28, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/12/russians-pay-price-anti-
turkish-measures-151228093600344.html 
 Official website of Ministry of Tourism and Culture of Turkey: 
http://www.kultur.gov.tr/?_dil=2 
 Özdal H., “Turkey-Russia Relations: Towards Normalization?”, Eurasia Review, July 
1, 2016. http://www.eurasiareview.com/01072016-turkey-russia-relations-towards-
normalization-analysis/ 
 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, Dec 3, 2015. 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50864 
 Resolution N1296 adopted by the Russian Government, Official Internet Portal of Legal 
Information (Russian Federation), Dec 1, 2015 
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201512010026 
 Resolution N1457  adopted by the Russian Government, Official Internet Portal of 
Legal Information (Russian Federation), Dec 30, 2015. 
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201512300053?index=2&rangeSi
ze=1 
 Resolution N1458 adopted by the Russian Government, Official Internet Portal of Legal 
Information (Russian Federation), Dec 30, 2015. 
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201512300040?index=5&rangeSi
ze=1 
77 
 
 Senerdem E., “5 graphs Turkey-Russia economic relations”, BBC Turkey, Nov. 25, 2015.        
http://www.bbc.com/turkce/ekonomi/2015/11/151125_turkiye_rusya_ekonomi 
 Sönmez M., “Cost of Russian crises continues to rise”, Hurriyet Daily News,  March 7, 
2016. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/cost-of-russian-crisis-continues-to-rise-96107 
 Tank P., “Turkey’s turn toward Russia”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,  
May 16, 2017. http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/69981 
 Tastekin F., “From ‘zero problems’ to zero trade”, Al-Monitor, Feb 27, 2015. www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/turkey-zeroproblems-to-zero-trade.html 
 Tharoor I., “Russia and Turkey accuse each other of buying oil from the Islamic State”, 
The Washington Post, Dec 2, 2015. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/12/02/russia-and-turkey-
accuse-each-other-of-buying-oil-from-the-islamic-state/?utm_term=.d8d10f40d464 
 The National Consortium for the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism, A center 
of excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland security. 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?expanded=no&search=turkey&ob=
GTDID&od=desc&page=11&count=50#results-table 
 Toll G., “Why is  Turkey silent on Russia’s cooperation with the Syrian Kurds”, Middle 
East Institute, Jan 3, 2018. http://www.mei.edu/content/why-turkey-silent-russia-s-
cooperation-syrian-kurds 
 Trenin D., “Really Burrying the Hatchet: Russia and Turkey find themselves on the 
same side”, Insight Turkey, April-June 2002, Vol. 4, No. 2. 
https://www.insightturkey.com/article_12/category 
 “Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan says Putin has not returned his call”, The Guardian, 
Nov 27, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2015/nov/27/turkey-recep-
tayyip-erdogan-putin-wont-return-his-calls-video 
 Walker S., “Putin and Erdoğan to have first meeting since jet downing”, The Guardian, 
Aug 9, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/08/putin-and-erdogan-to-
have-first-meeting-since-jet-downing 
 
 
78 
 
Appendices  
 
Table 4.1. Russia’s FDI into Economies of Major Direct Investment Recipient Countries (million 
USD) 
Russia’s FDI into Economies of Major Direct Investment Recipient Countries 
(million USD) 
Year 2015 2016 
Cyprus 22085 22314 
Virgin Islands (British) 1475 1184 
Switzerland 203 1433 
Bahamas 1054 1205 
Turkey 1475 1184 
Source: Federal State Statistics Service (Russian Statistical Yearbook, p. 307) 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/main/ 
 
Table 4.2. Russia’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (million USD) 
Russia’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (million USD) 
Year 2015 2016 
Total 22085 22314 
In Turkey 1475 1184 
Share in total (%)  6,68 5,31 
Federal State Statistics Service (Russian Statistical Yearbook, p. 307) 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/main/ 
 
Table 4.3. Number of Russian Tourists Arrived in Turkey (thousands) 
Number of Russian Tourists Arrived in Turkey (thousands) 
In 2015 3,649,003 
In 2016 866,256 
Total in 2015 36,244,632 
Share in total (%) 10,1 
Total in 2016 25,352,213 
Share in total (%) 3,4 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute database http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do 
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Table 4.4. Turkey’s tourism revenues in total and from Russian visitors (2015-2016)  
                (million USD)  
Turkey’s tourism revenues in total and from Russian visitors (2015-
2016) (million USD) 
 2015 2016 
Total 22,1 31,44 
From Russian visitors 2,31 0,57 
Source:  Ministry of Culture and Tourism (Republic of Turkey) Link 
 
Table 4.5. Turkey’s Import from Russian (USD)  
Turkey’s Foreign Trade (Import from Russia) (USD) 
In 2015 20,401,756,568 
In 2016 15,162,386,047 
Turkey’s Total Import (USD) 
In 2015 207,234,358,616 
In 2016 198,618,235,047 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute database http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do 
 
Table 4.5.1. Turkey’s Imports by country and year (thousand USD) 
Turkey’s Imports by country and year (thousand USD) 
 2015 2016 
Total 207 234 359 198 618 235 
China 24 873 457 25 441 433 
Germany 21 351 884 21 474 989 
Russia 20 401 757 15 162 386 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute database http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do 
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Table 4.6. Turkey’s Export to Russian (USD) 
Turkey’s Foreign Trade (Export to Russia) (USD) 
In 2015 3,588,330,986 
In 2016 1,732,953,579 
Turkey’s  Total Export ( USD) 
In 2015 143,838,871,428 
In 2016 142,529,583,808 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute database http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do 
 
Table 4.6.1. Russia’s export to Turkey by country in 2015 (million USD) 
Russia’s export to Turkey by country in 2015 (million USD) 
Netherlands 40848 
China 28601 
Germany 25351 
Italy 22294 
Turkey 19287 
Total 343512 
Source: Federal State Statistics Service (Russian Statistical Yearbook, p. 570) 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/main/ 
 
Table 4.7. GDP of Turkey by years (billion USD) 
GDP of Turkey by years (billion USD) 
2015 2016 
859.38 857.75 
Source: World Bank database http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx 
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